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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The importance of communication in every aspect of 
behavior is widely recognized. Communicative activities 
pervade virtually everything with which human beings are 
concerned, and it is often said that symbolic communication 
is the most fundamental distinguishing characteristic of 
the human species.̂  Indeed, as Wiener states, communica­
tion M. . . belong/s/- to the essence of man’s inner life, 
even as £itj belong/s7 to his life in society, ” 2 In sci­
ence, and particularly in the social and behavioral sci­
ences, communication stands out as a principal, and perhaps 
a unifying, concept.3*4 Modern science, however, tends to 
be quantitative.5 Although the qualitative observations of 
philosophers, psychologists, and rhetoricians have played 
a role in the history of the study of communication, these
1Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings {Gar­
den City, New fork: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), pp* 62-03*
2Ibid.. p. 10,
3colin Cherry, On Human Communication (Mew York:
Science Editions, Inc,,■1901), p. 2.
^Charles W, Morris, "Foundations of the Theory of 
Signs," International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,
Vol. 1, No. 2 {Chicago, III.: The University of -Chicago
Press, 1930), p. 54ff.
5j. R, Wilson, An Introduction to Scientific Research 
{New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co,, Inc., 1952), p. 23.
2
efforts resulted in few testable theories about communica­
tive phenomena and provided little that could be said with 
scientific certainty.
The Mature and Importance of the Study
With the recent mathematical developments which come 
under the heading of the "Theory of Communication,” a method 
of quantifying some communicative activities was intro­
duced. 6 One of the most widely known of these formulations 
is that most often associated with Claude E. Shannon, re­
ferred to as "Information Theory,”? Although the theory 
had its origins in the study of electrical eommuncation,^ 
several of the basic concepts were quickly adapted for the 
psychological analyses of human behavior,9,10
As a mathematical formulation, information theory 
proceeds from clear definitions and assumptions to theorems
Ĉherry, p, 2,
?Use of the term "information theory" had been widely 
criticized, primarily due to the association of information 
with meaningful material. As shall be seen, however, "in­
formation" in the context of the theory to be discussed has 
a very specific reference and its use is highly restricted,
R. Pierce, Symbols, Signals» and Moise (Hew York: 
Harper.and Hoe, Publishers, 1961), p. 24.
Ĝ. A, Miller and P. C, Frick, "Statistical Behavior- 
istics and Sequences of Responses," Psychological Review. 56 
(1949), 311-324.
A. Miller and J. A, Selfridge, "Verbal Context 
and the Recall of Meaningful Material," American Journal of 
Psychology» 63 (1950), 176-165.
concerning information sources, communication channels, and 
"noise, ” 11 The validity of applying the theorems, then, to 
behavioral research is directly dependent on whether, in 
fact, the definitions and assumptions have logical corre­
lates in the experimental situation. 12 As Chronbach points 
out, "A use of information theory may be taken seriously 
only when the author shows a specified rationale for des­
cribing his data by Shannon*s measure."1̂  Several studies 
have dealt with the validity of applying information theory 
techniques to experimental psychology; H , 15»16 and insofar 
as the study of interpersonal communication is a behavioral 
science, the parameters of applicability of information 
theory analyses to interpersonal communication research 
have been, to this extent, already discussed.
While, however, there is a certain similarity be­
tween the psychological studies employing informational 
analyses and those in interpersonal communication, Luce
11 Pierce, p. 18,
1̂ Colin Cherry, "On the Validity of Applying Com­
munication Theory to Experimental Psychology,” British 
Journal of Psychology, 4$ (1957), 176-1BB,
1̂ Lee J, Chronbach, "On the Mon-Rational Application 
of Information Measures in Psychology,” Information Theory 
in Psychology, ed. Henry Quastler (Glencoe, 111.: The Free
IbressV 1955), p. 24.
1̂ Arnold Binder and Burton R. Wolin, "Informational 
Models and Their Uses,” Psvehometrika, 29 (1964), 29-54.
^5cherry, "On the Validity-—
<0Chronbach,
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points out that little of the work in psychology has been 
concerned with problems traditionally classed as communi­
cation.^ Many psychological studies employing information 
theory, for example, deal with such traditional psychologi­
cal problems as reaction time,1& pattern perception,^ and 
intelligence tests. 20 It is recognized, of course, that 
the distinction between communication-oriented psychological 
research and behaviorally-oriented communication research 
is at best vague and unclear.21 There appears to be, how­
ever, a clear distinction between reaction time studies—  
a traditional research problem in psychology— and speech 
and language studies, more often completed in communication 
programs. Again, however, it must be stressed that the 
distinction drawn is not so much one of academic disciplines
1?R. Duncan Luce, nThe Theory of Selective Informa­
tion and Some of its Behavioral Applications,w Developments 
in Mathematical Psychology. ed. E, Duncan Luce (Glencoe, " 
111.: The Free Press, 1960),. p. 51.
1%. E. Hick, "On the Rate of Gain of Information,"
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 4 (1952),
Ti-2o.
1̂ E. T. Elemmer and F. C. Frick, "Assimilation of 
Information from Dot and Matrix Patterns," Journal of Ex­
perimental Psychology. 45 (1953)* 15-19.
E. Hick, "Information Theory and Intelligence 
Tests," British Journal of Psychology* 4 (1951)* 157-164.
21It is to be noted, by way of clarification of this
issue, that much, if not most, of the work in information
theory which might well be thought of as communication re­
search has been undertaken by psychologists.
5
as one of types of research efforts, methods of investiga­
tion, and more importantly, the phenomena which are investi­
gated. To the degree that interpersonal communication 
research, specifically concerned with the process of commu­
nication, is distinct from other behavioral research, the 
criteria provided for the application of informational 
analyses will be different. As of 1968, there appears to 
be no statement of the criteria for applying information 
theory rationale to behavioral investigations of interper­
sonal communication.
As previously mentioned, the application of infor­
mation theory as a model is predicated on the correspondence 
between the definitions and assumptions of the mathematical 
theory and the research situation. Given the definitions 
and assumptions, then, a problem which immediately arises 
is that of determining under what research conditions these 
definitions and assumptions do have correspondence. That 
is, it is necessary to determine if and how the definitions 
and assumptions have logical correlates in specific research 
situations. Moreover, It would be of considerable assis­
tance to the researcher if some broad criteria could be 
provided for determining if any particular piece of commu­
nication research has, in fact, logical correlates between 
the research situation and the definitions and assumptions. 
Future researchers intending to use information theory
6
could then become aware of some of the problems they might 
encounter during the course of their investigation and, per­
haps, devise methods by which these problems might be allevi­
ated.
The Purpose of the Study
The purposes of the thesis are to:
1, Review the historical and mathematical back­
grounds of information theory}
2, State the basic assumptions of the theory}
3* Briefly review the literature of applications 
of information theory in some types of research;
4, Analyze a number of selected studies in inter­
personal communication research which employ information 
theory, determining if and why (or why not) those studies 
show logical correlates between the assumptions of the 
theory and the experimental design; and
3, Formulate, from the analyses of the studies,
some general problems and problem areas which an investigator 
might meet in the course of an informational study in inter­
personal communication research.
Limitations of the Study
The sheer magnitude of the literature utilizing in­
formation theory techniques, as well as the practical limi­
tations of time placed upon this researcher, prohibits any
7
complete survey of the literature in communication research. 
Moreover, informational concepts are often employed for the 
analyses of phenomena (such as in speech signal analysis) 
which require a technical competence beyond that of this 
researcher* For these and other reasons, it has been deemed 
prudent to generally limit the scope of this study, in keep­
ing with the purposes stated above, to selected studies in 
traditional Interpersonal communication research which employ 
information theory analysis. The selection of the studies 
was dependent, in large part, on the intuitive feeling of 
the author concerning which studies best illustrate a par­
ticular type of application, although an attempt has been 
made, beyond this, to cover as wide a range of research as 
possible.
The study will not be concerned with detailed treat­
ments of electrical communication systems, statistical and 
mathematical developments based on information measures 
and theory, or, in general, the analysis of speech signals 
such as in experimental phonetics and acoustics* The review 
of the literature in the area is similarly limited. There 
are several important journals in the area of the experi­
mental study of communicative activities which have not 
been perused since it was felt that the technical background 
necessary in order to undertake a critical analysis of those 
studies was beyond that of this researcher.
CHAPTER II
THE FUNDAMENTAL NATURE OF "INFORMATION THEORY’1
In the last section the need for some criteria for 
the valid application of informational analyses was dis­
cussed, and the purpose of the paper was defined relative 
to those criteria. In this chapter an examination of the 
nature of information theory will be undertaken by providing 
an historical context, a review of the system which infor­
mation theory presupposes, and a discussion of the theory 
itself, especially with reference to its assumptions.
A Hrief Historical Review
The study of communicative processes is by no means 
new. From the times of the ancients to the present, the 
significance of symbolic behavior has held the attention 
of scholars from virtually every area of interest. Phil­
osophers, rhetoricians, social thinkers, and others have 
been concerned with the effects that speech and language 
have on the behavior of the speaker as well as the listener. 
Science, too, has had a long-standing interest in the phe­
nomena. As Wiener says, ’’The place of the study of commu­
nication in the history of science is neither trivial, for­
tuitous, nor new. Even before Newton, such problems were 
current in physics. . .
1Wiener, p. 18.
•9-
Through electrical communication, however, consider­
able impetus was provided for the development of the statis­
tical aspects of signal transmission. Samuel F. B. Morse, 
in developing his widely used telegraph code, became one of 
the first persons to utilize the statistical dimension of 
language for increasing the efficiency of transmission.̂  
Morris constructed a two-state code based on the relative 
frequency of occurrence of the letters of the English alpha­
bet. Although his estimates of the frequency of occurrence 
of the letters were found using the relatively crude method 
of counting the quantities of type used in a printer's of­
fice, Morse's code was well suited to minimizing the time 
necessary for the transmission of English phrases. This 
code, however, was based on descriptive statistics; what 
communication engineers needed was an exact measure of in­
formation transmitted.3
One of the first important contributions to the de­
velopment of such a measure was that of H. Nyquist in 1924. 
Myquist published an article in the Bell System Technical 
Journal which considered ,!two fundamental factors entering 
into the maximum speed of transmission of intelligence by
2Cherry, On Human Communication. p. 35. 
3Ibid., p. 33-35.
telegraph . . . signal shaping and choice of codes."4” Some 
four years later, E. V. L. Hartley, in the same journal, 
suggested "a quantitative measure of * information1 . , * 
based on physical as contrasted with psychological consider 
ations."^ This measure, now common to much of the work in 
communication theory, is given by taking "as our practical 
measure of information the logarithm of the number of pos­
sible symbol sequences.As Cherry points out, Hartleyfs 
definition is derived by showing
that a message of M signs chosen from an "alphabet” or 
code book of S signs has Sjl possibilities and that the 
"quantity of information"" is most reasonably defined 
as the logarithm, that is, H = N log S.7
It is Hartley*s work which may be regarded as the genesis
of modern communication theory.^
Following the publication of this article, however,
a silent period lasting some twenty years began, to be
Ĥ. Myquist, "Certain Factors Affecting Telegraph 
Speed," Bell System Technical Journal, 3 (1925), p. 324.
5h. ?. L, Hartley, "Transmission of Information," 
Bell System Technical Journal. 7 {192$), 535-563, p. 535.
6Ibid., p. 540.
?C berry, On Human Communication. p. 43*
%bid.
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broken only occasionally by some work in statistics.9*10
In 1946 Gabor took up the idea of "uncertainty” in an
article entitled "Theory of Communicationintroducing the
concept of the "logon,” or the basic element
into which such complex signals such as speech may 
be analysed and upon which a representation of the 
signals must be based. . , . Such a basic element is 
the smallest which can be consideredj it is regarded 
as a "unit of structural information, ” 11
The maturation of the basic concepts of information
theory into a rigorous formalized theory was chiefly the
result of the efforts of Norbert Wiener of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and his former student, Claude E.
Shannon of the Bell Telephone Laboratories, In a two-part
paper entitled "A Mathematical Theory of Communication,"^
Shannon pointed out that both Myquist and Hartley had seen
the need for a measure of information based on the number
of alternative possibilities and which was also logarithmic.
Garner adds:
Shannon made two critical contributions to these ideas. 
The first was to- treat the problem in a more general
Ŝir Ronald Fisher, The Design of Experiments, 
(London: Oliver and Boyd, 1935)*
1%, A. Fisher, Statistical Method for Research 
Workers (10th ed.; Edinburgh": Oliver and Boyd , 1946'T.
Ucherry, On Human Communication, p. 43*
12Claude E. Shannon, "A Mathematical Theory of 
Communication,” Bell System Technical Journal» 27 (1.94$) 
pp. 379, 623,
'\
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statistical sense, so that we no longer have Just num­
ber of categories or possible messages, but we have each 
category or message with a stated probability of occur­
rence, The second was to provide a method for dealing 
with the effects of noise in a communication system,
As Wiener had predicted,14 the concepts of communi­
cation theory were soon shown to have relevance far beyond 
their intended scope in electrical communication. Among the 
first to see the broad potential for information theory was 
Warren Weaver, who wrote a short, non-technical exposition 
of Shannon’s formulations, and some additional implications, 
for the Scientific American.^ This article, in an expanded 
and somewhat more complete version, was later published to­
gether with Shannon’s original work in book form,16 and has 
since been recognised as a "classic” in communication theory.
Within a year after the publication of this book, 
the psychologists Miller and Frick had employed information 
measures in the analysis of sequential behavior,17 A steady 
increase in the use of the new "informational analysis” in 
psychological as well as other areas of research continued
1̂ Wendell R, Garner, Uncertainty and Structure as 
Psychological Concepts (Hew York: John Wiley and Sons,
1962)', p* 9*"
1̂ Herbert Wiener, Cybernetics (Hew York: John Wiley
and Sons, Inc•, 1943),
1%arren Weaver, "The Mathematics of Communication,” 
Scientific American. 1§1 (1949), pp, 11-15,
^shannon and Weaver,
1̂ Miller and Frick.
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until about 1954, when an apparent plateau was reached in 
applications of the measures in behavioral research.1̂  The 
rapid expansion in the use of the concepts of information 
theory in psychology, as Garner suggests, may in part be 
attributable to the mathematical Zeitgeist in psychology 
during the years around and folloifing 194$.^ In any case, 
this increase of interest in information theory led to 
several symposia on the subject and its applications in 
various disciplines,20 a large number of books and articles,21 
and to the publication of at least two journals which are 
largely devoted to the theory and its developments•22
A Communication System
The formalization of Shannon’s mathematical theory
/of communication is predicated on a particular model of a
1%,uce, p. 51*
1^Garner.
2 Ât least three such symposia have been published 
by Butterworths in London. See, for example, Colin Cherry 
(ed.), Information Theory Fourth London Symposium (London; 
Butterworths, 1961), especially the ’'Preface,1' p.v.
21 Several relatively complete bibliographies of 
information theory have already been published. For example, 
see F. L. Stumpers, ,fA Bibliography of Information Theory 
(Communication Theory— Cybernetics)Transactions of the 
Institute of Radio Engineers. Professional Group on Infor­
mation fheoryT 1953, 1.
22Information and Control and the above mentioned 
Transactions or the Institute. . . «
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communication system. As Walker says of models:
The essential content of the concept of model is the 
existence of a correspondence between the model itself 
and the prototype. , . ,
Models do not always have to be invented or construc­
ted, but they do have to be recognized.23
Very briefly, Shannon’s model consists of (1) a 
source« which selects series of signals or messages from 
a known set of possible messages {whose probabilities are 
also known); (2 ) a transmitter. or sender, which translates 
the message selected by the source into a signal capable 
of being transmitted (i.e., "matches" the message to the 
channel); (3 ) a channel, or transmitting medium; (4 ) © 
receiver, which changes the transmitted signal back into 
a message and hands it on, finally, to the (5) destination. 
or the end-point in the system. It often happens in the 
transmission of the message from the source to the destina­
tion that undesirable signals are introduced, thus distort­
ing the message. These signals or distortions are referred 
to as "noise," and will be discussed at some length later. 
This communication system is illustrated in Figure 1. Since 
it happens that the model there shown is of particular 
interest with respect to an analysis of the assumptions of 
the the theory, it shall be helpful to quote Shannon
^Marshall Walker, The Mature of Scientific Thought. 
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), P« 3.
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Figure 1
information
source transmitter receiver destination
signal received
signal
message
extensively with respect to it:
By a communication system we will mean a system of 
the type indicated consisting of essentially five parts:
1* An information source which produces a message or 
sequence of messages to be communicated to the receiving 
terminal. The message may be of various types: (a) a
sequence of letters as in a telegraph or teletype sys­
tem; (b) a single function of time f(t) as in radio or 
telephony. ...
2. A transmitter which operates on the message in 
some way to produce a signal suitable for transmission 
over the channel. In telephony this operation consists 
merely of changing sound pressure into a proportional 
electrical current. In telegraphy we have an encoding 
operation which produces a sequence of dots, dashes, and 
spaces on the channel corresponding to the message. . . .
3. The channel is merely the medium used to transmit 
the signal from transmitter to receiver. It may be a 
pair of wires, a coaxial cable, a band of radio frequen­
cies, a beam of light, etc. During transmission, or at 
one of the terminals, the signal may be perturbed by noise. This is indicated ... by the noise source
16
acting on the transmitted signal to produce the received signal.24
4. The receiver ordinarily performs the inverse 
operation of that done by the transmitter, reconstruct­
ing the message from the signal,
5. The destination is the person (or thing) for whom the message is intended.2?
It is clear that this model has as its prototype a 
physical communication system. Applications of information 
theory in behavioral research, however, are predicated on 
the correspondence of this model to experimental conditions. 
While it is true, as Walker says, that "a single correspon­
dence is often enough to provide a very useful model,n2̂  and 
that ”no claim is made about the ’reality* of the model; the 
sole criterion is successful predication from simplest, most 
convenient, or most satisfying model, ” 27 it is also true, as
Chronbach points out, that:
A considerable burden of proof is assumed when one 
argues from the,empirical data that one has a proper 
description of nature . . . a burden that is not
24fhe employment of Shannon’s model of a communica­
tion system in behavioral research has been subjected to 
considerable criticism (much of it justifiable}, One such 
criticism often heard is that Shannon’s communication system 
does not account for noise introduced at points other than 
the channel. As the statement quoted clearly shows, how­
ever, this criticism is unjustified. It is likely that much 
of the criticism based on this issue resulted from his illus­
tration (similar to Figure 1) which shows the noise source 
acting only at the channel*
2 Ŝhannon and Weaver, pp. 33-34. 2%alker» p* 3,
27Ibid., p, 5,
17
shouldered if the measure is advanced on rational 
grounds.2®
The adaption of the communication model presupposed 
by Shannon to behavioral research necessitates that the sub­
ject (s) or the human operator(s) be represented in the model. 
Cherry says:
Comparison between a human operator and a communica­
tion channel is today commonplace; the stimuli represent 
the "input” signals applied to his sense organs, while 
his overt responses represent ’’output” signals; the hu­
man operator represents the ”transducer.”29
The problems emerging from such a comparison are 
numerous and shall be considered later* In any case, it is 
apparent that this model is not the only possible model for 
use in either communication research or behavioral investi­
gations* It often happens, in fact, according to some re­
searchers, that the model is wholly inadequate.^
A Mathematical Theory of Communication
Fundamental to a scientific investigation of the 
process of communication is some means of quantifying that 
which is communicated, and that which is communicated may
2^Chronbach, p. 16.
2%herry, ”0n the Validity. . . 9n p. 16.
-^For an excellent review of some of the models of 
communication proposed by various researchers, as well as 
the reasons for their adaption, see F. Craig Johnson and 
George B, Klare, "General Models of Communication Research:
A Survey of the Developments of a Decade, ’1 Journal of Com­
munication . 11 (1961), 13-26.
1 a
be Identified as "information."31 Broadly speaking, there 
are three basic aspects of quantifiable information, The 
identification of the first of these aspects can be attri- 
buted, in large part, to D, Gabor and is termed structural 
information. The primary concern in the measurement of 
structural information is the degree of complexity of the 
form of a representation.-^ There is, for example, more 
structural information in the categorization of something 
into one of 100 classes than there is in the categorization 
of something into one of 10 classes; this difference is 
expressed in "logons,"
A second aspect of information is measured by the 
degree of confidence which a description merits. That is, 
there is more information in a statement with an accuracy 
of 1 per cent than there is in a statement with an accuracy 
of only 10 per cent. This kind of information is known as 
metrical information. and its unit of measurement is the 
"matron."
To clarify the third aspect of information, that which 
is of fundamental concern in this thesis, it will prove help­
ful to draw on an illustration given by Warren Weaver;
3 Ĝarner, p. 2.
3barren Weaver, "Information Theory: 1. Informa­
tion Theory to 1951— A Non-Technical Review," Journal of 
Speech and Hearing Disorders. 17 (1952), 16o-74•
19
A friend tells you something; but you remark after­
ward, "I didn’t get much information, because what he 
said was almost exactly what I was sure he would say.” 
This remark emphasizes, and with shrewd accuracy, that 
from one point of view a remark has high informative 
content if it is unexpected, the more unexpectedness, 
the more information,This is the kind of information 
(or the aspect of information) which in present theory 
is referred to as selective information. . . .  A unit 
of selective information is called a bit.33>34
More explicitly, as Garner states:
Any communicative act provides information only insofar 
as it reduces a condition of ignorance or uncertainty35 
about the state of things under consideration*3©
And:
Information occurs only if there exists some a priori 
uncertainty, and the amount of Information is determined 
fry frfre amount of uncertainty— or, more exactly, it is determined by the amount by which the uncertainty has 
been reduced. Information and uncertainty are closely 
related concepts, and if we can measure uncertainty, we 
can measure information as the decrease of uncertainty. 
These opposing concepts— uncertainty as a state of ignor­
ance, and information as the opposed reduction of
33ibid.. p. 16S.
3^8Ince this paper is concerned only with ”selective 
information,” and not with "structural” or "metrical” in­
formation, the term "selective" will hereafter be omitted 
with the understanding that, unless otherwise stated, it is 
"selective information” under consideration.
3^Luce has this to say about the term "uncertainty";
It must be mentioned that this use of the word "uncertainty" 
is at variance with its use in (statistical) decision theory. 
There, if an a priori probability distribution is known, one 
speaks of decision making under risk, and uncertainty is 
reserved for these cases where the distribution is not com­
pletely known. Thus, if the two vocabularies were to be 
consistent, H, information, should be described as an ave­
rage measure"*of risk, not of uncertainty.Luce, p. 27.
^Garner, p. 3 .
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uncertainty— are quantitatively the same thing. 37
These statements are indicative of some a priori 
stipulations which it seems reasonable to impose on whatever 
measure of information is proposed. First, it is intui­
tively to be expected that as the number of possible out­
comes of an event increases (i.e., as the uncertainty in­
creases), the information being sought is that the measure 
should be a monotonically increasing function of the number 
of possible outcomes* Second, the measure of information 
should show that each successive event adds the same amount 
of uncertainty (or certainty), and thus provides the same 
amount of information} that is, the measure should be addi­
tive.
The measure which satisfies these conditions is a 
logarithmic one, of the form
(1.1) H *» £ log k
where H is the information, k is the number of possible out­
comes, and £ is a proportionality constant whose function is 
to establish the particular unit of measurement.3® It often 
happens that a choice is made between two alternatives (e.g., 
"yes-no,” "on-off,” etc.), and it has become accepted prac­
tice to use the logarithm to the base two for this m e a s u r e,39
37ibid. 3%bid., p. 4.
39sesidea satisfying the intuitive feelings which 
may seem desirable of a measure of information mentioned
21
and to define the unit of measurement in that logarithmic 
system so that the proportionality constant becomes 1, thus 
giving
(1.2) H - log2 k4 0 *41
In the base two system of measurement information is ex­
pressed in "bits ,,f a term proposed by J. W. Tukey^ from
above, Shannon adds,
The logarithmic measure is more convenient for various 
reasons:
1. It is practically more useful. Parameters of 
engineering importance such as time, bandwidth, number of 
relays, etc., tend to very lineraly with the logarithm of 
the number of possibilities. For example, adding one relay 
to a group doubles the number of possible states of the re­
lays. It adds 1 to the base 2 logarithm of this number. 
Doubling the time roughly squares the number of possible 
messages, or doubles the logarithm, etc.
2. It is nearer to our intuitive feeling as to the 
proper measure. This is related to (1) since we intuitively 
measure entities by linear comparison with common standards. 
One feels, for example, that two punched cards should have 
twice the capacity of one for information storage, and two 
identical channels twice the capacity of one for transmit­
ting information.
3. It is mathematically more suitable. Many of the 
limiting operations are simple in terms of the logarithm 
but would require clumsy restatement in terms of the number 
of possibilities. Shannon and Weaver, p. 32.
^Garner, p. 4.
^It should be clear that the adoption of the log­
arithm to the base 2 is arbitrary, and that, as Garner says, 
"any logarithmic system would have served the purpose just 
as well. In fact, all measurements of uncertainty and 
information can be made in the common system of logarithms 
to the base 10. . . ." Garner, p. 5. The name given to 
the unit of information when measured in the base 10 system 
is the "Hartley."
Shannon and Weaver, p. 32.
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the contraction of the two words "binary digit."
As an illustrative example of what this formula 
represents, a set of elements (sides of a coin, suits in 
a deck of cards, or any such case where the probability of 
selection of the elements are equally likely) might be 
considered. If there are n elements, and n is of the form 
2— (as in the two cases above), where N is an integer (in 
the above cases, 1 and 2 respectively), then it can be shown 
that there are no more than N bits of information conveyed 
when an element is chosen from this set.^ When n «* 2— , 
then N “ logg n by definition of the logarithm, and thus in 
this situation there are log2 n bits of information per ele- 
ment.
As Pierce points out, however:
This measure is acceptable in the light of our present 
knowledge of information theory only if successive sym­
bols are chosen independently and if any of the symbols 
is equally likely to be selected* 45
In most cases of selection, it happens that one of 
the elements of the set from which the selection is made is 
more or less likely to be selected than some of the others,
^Use of the term "bit" has come under some criti­
cism due to its continued association with the phrase "bit 
of information,” To avoid these difficulties, Goldman has 
suggested the term "binit,,! (S. Goldman, Information Theory, 
/lew York: Prentice-Hall, 195̂ 7)» but "bit" came into such
wide-spread acceptance and usage that it was defined by an 
Institute of Radio Engineers Standards Committee in 195$, 
Garner, p, 4.
^Luee, pp, 14-15* ^Pierce, p, 40.
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Luce, in this context, says:
A moment’s reflection about English will suggest 
two important statistical facts about many sources:
1, There is no reason to suppose that the probabil­ity that one symbol will be selected is the same as 
that for another symbol: the letter !iz" is much less 
frequently used in English than is ” e."
2, In general, the choice of one symbol in the 
middle of a message will not be independent of the 
preceding choices: although an ”e” has a high a priori probability of being chosen, the probability is markedly 
increased if the letters "automobil" have been re­ceived.^
In order to deal with the first case, those situa­
tions in which some symbols may be selected more commonly 
than others, it is necessary to introduce a measure of 
average uncertainty.
If there is a single variable, x, which can take any 
value x^t where 1 = 1  to k, and if each value has p (x̂ ) 
chance of occurring, then the information associated with 
th. selection of any particular xt is given as
(1.3) H “ - log,, p(x,).^7»4S
It can be seen that this formula has a very reasonable
^Luee, p. 19. ^Garner, p. 20.
^%he minus sign on the right hand side of this 
equation is the result of a characteristic of logarithms; 
that is, the logarithm of a number less than 1 is always 
negative. Since probabilities are always less than or 
equal to 1, the minus sign serves to multiply the right 
side of the equation by -1, thereby rendering the result 
positive. This makes for easier computation and more 
"sensible” answers, since if this step were not taken, 
one would end up with "negative information."
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property} that is, when the probability, p{x^), that event 
Xj_ will be selected is very high (approaches 1), then the 
information transmitted by that selection is very low5 
and similarly, if the probability is low, the information 
is high. Obviously, if all x̂  have equal chance of occur­
ring, then the above formula gives the identical result as 
in 1.2.
Using this formula, it is possible to determine the 
information transmitted by the selection of any x̂  in the 
distribution. Moreover, if all elements have equal prob­
ability of selection /i.e., if p(x-j) « pCxg) «*...*= pCx̂ J/, 
then the formula also gives the average amount of informa­
tion transmitted per symbol by the whole distribution (since, 
if all have equal probability of occurring, the average 
overall elements will be the same as that for any individ­
ual element).
On the other hand, if not all of the have an 
equal chance of occurring, then in order to compute the 
average information of the entire distribution it is nec­
essary to find a weighted average of all of the probabili­
ties p(xj_), for all Xj_ in the distribution. The weighted 
average, of course, is obtained simply by multiplying the 
probability of occurrence of any x̂  by the information 
transmitted by the selection of that Thus, the average
information over the whole distribution is simply the sum
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of the information of each, x̂  ̂ -log2p(x̂ J7  multiplied by 
its probability of occurrence /p{x^J7:
(1.4) H = - p{x^JloggpCx^) - p(x2)log2p(x2)
- . . .  - pix̂ Jloĝ plxjj.), 
or, in mathematical notation,
(1.5) H « - p(xi)log2p(xi),
where i a 1, 2, * . . , kA^
This formula enables one to deal with situations
such as those Luce mentions in his first point; that is,
evaluating the information transmitted when all alterna­
tives are not equally likely. Still, however, the employ­
ment of this formula necessitates that the selections be 
independent (i.e., that the selection of one element does 
not affect the selection of the following element) , The 
second statistical fact about English that Luce makes is, 
however, that "the choice of one symbol in the middle of 
a message will not be independent of the preceding choices.
. . In order to compute the information transmitted
by such non-independent selections, then, it is necessary 
that the formula be modified. It is not essential that the 
derivation for these formulations be discussed in detail, 
since the results obtained for the independent case.readily
^Garner, p, 21 
^ Luce, p. 19.
-̂ Pierce, p. 40.
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carry over to the non-independent case. But first, as Luce 
says:
We shall have to assume that the source is homogeneous 
in time, so that its statistical character— measured by 
any statistical parameter we choose— is the same at one 
time as at any other time. Such a source is said to be 
stationary and the time series (of symbol selections) 
is called a stationary time series. This assumption is essential to the theory. . . .52
Given this assumption, the definition of information can
be applied with little alteration to the non-independent
source:
(1.6) I - g  PjPj(I) log^d)
bits per symbol, where I is the average information per 
symbol, 1̂  is the information of a symbol generated when 
the process is in state j, Pj is the probability that state 
j will occur, and p . (i) is the transitional probability that 
when the process is in state j the ith of a alternative sym­
bols will o c c u r . *54
Clearly, if the choice of a symbol, i, depends in 
part on what preceding symbol, j, has been chosen, then in 
general, less "new information" is conveyed by the selection
2̂Ibid.. pp. 19-20.
George A Miller, "Speech and Language," Handbook 
of Experimental Psychology. Ed. 3. S. Stephens (Mew York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1951)> XXI, p, 792.
^For the purposes of this paper, Miller's formula 
has been somewhat modified in order to move a constant pre­
ceding the summation, but corrected in stating the logarith­
mic base two.
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of i than if that selection had been made independently 
of j. Of course, such inter-symbol influence may extend 
much farther back than to just the one symbol immediately 
prior to the selection of it to two, four, or 100 preceding 
symbols. Then:
By reducing the range of choice, the context gives 
us information about what the next item is going to be. 
Thus, when the next word occurs, some of the information 
it conveys is identical with information we have already 
received from the context. This repeated information is 
called "redundancy."??
Although there is a good deal more to the theory 
than has been given here, the presentation of but one more 
aspect of the theory will be sufficient for the purposes of 
this section. This aspect is the concept of "channel capa­
city."
A number of i n v e s t i g a t o r s ^  »57,5& have shown that 
any physical communication channel has a finite capacity 
for transmitting information from a discrete source.59
55George A, Miller, "What is Information Measure­
ment?" American Psychologist. £(1953)> p. S.
5%. Kupfmuller, !,Uber insehwiengvorgange in Wellen- 
filtern?" Blektrlsche Aaohrichtentechnik. 1 (1924), p. 141 
(cited in Garner, p. 9*H
5?Kyquist. ^^Hartley.
59fhe discrete source is one which generates messages 
by temporally ordered sequences of selections from a finite 
set of possible choices. It is distinguished from the "con­
tinuous" source, which makes but one selection from a con­
tinuum of elements. The continuous source has been of little 
importance in the behavioral sciences. Luce, p. 16.
2a
In his formulations, however, Shannon went much further
j
than this, principally in connection with his ”fundamental
theorems.” Weaver explains,
This theorem relates to a communication channel which 
has a capacity of C bits per second, accepting signals 
from a source of entropy (or information) of H bits per 
second* The theorem states that by devising proper 
coding procedures for the transmitter it is possible to 
transmit symbols over the channel at an average rate 
which is nearly C/H, but which, no matter how clever 
the coding, can never be made to exceed C/H.60
With respect to the noisy channel, an equally powerful
theorem can be stated. In these cases the channel capacity
is defined to be the difference between the total uncertainty
reaching the destination and the uncertainty introduced by
noise (i.e., the maximum rate at which "useful” Information
can be transmitted). Again, Weaver explains the theorem:
Suppose that a noisy channel has ... a capacity C, 
suppose it is accepting from an information source 
characterized by an entropy of H(x) bits per second, 
the entropy of the received signals being H(y) bits 
per second. If the channel capacity C is equal to or 
larger than H(x), then by devising appropriate coding 
systems, the output of the source can be transmitted 
over the channel with as little error as one pleases. 
However small a frequency of error you specify, there is 
a code which meets the demand. But if the channel 
capacity G is less than H(x), the entropy of the source 
from which it accepts messages, then it Is impossible 
to devise codes which reduce the error frequency as low 
as one may please.
However clever one is with the coding process, it 
will always be true that after the signal is received 
there remains some undesirable (noise) uncertainty about 
what the message was; and this undesirable uncertainty—
^Shannon and Weaver, p. 17
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this equivocation— will always be equal to or greater 
than H(x) - C. Furthermore, there is always at least 
one code which is capable of reducing this undesirable 
uncertainty, concerning the message, down to a value 
which exceeds H(x) - C by an arbitrarily small amount.61
This completes the treatment of the mathematics of 
information theory in this s e c t i o n . 6 2
The Assumptions of Shannon*s Theory
Underlying Shannon’s "mathematical theory of communi­
cation" is a set of basic assumptions from which the theorems 
are derived.63 As Cherry points out, however,
the theory was first set up to describe the properties 
of a communication source, channel and receiver, as 
exampled, say, by a teleprinter channel, such a system 
is not precisely analogous to a human operator with his sense-stirauli and overt responses.64
In view of the disparity between applications to electrical 
communication systems with which the theory was originally 
intended to deal, and the applications of the theory wherein 
the human operator {"subject") is considered as a communica­
tion channel, it will be helpful to list the basic assumptions
61Ibid.. pp. 21-22.
6^The mathematically-inclined reader will find the 
treatment here somewhat simple and incomplete. A number of 
rigorous formalizations of the theory have been presented, 
however, which are readily available, for example: Luce;
A. I. Kuchin, Mathematical Foundations of Information Theory, 
trans. it. A. Silverman and H. C. Friedman {New York: Dover,
1957).
^Pierce, p. 9.
64cherry, "On the Validity . . • p. 177.
30
of Shannon’s theory and later point to some possible prob­
lems which might arise when the human operator is considered 
as a communication channel*
The assumptions underlying information theory as it 
relates to the physical communication system envisioned by 
Shannon are stated by Cherry*
1 * The theory is expressed entirely in the (meta-) 
language of an external observer, not in that of one of 
the participants. . . . We observe a communication 
channel only by setting up another— the "Observation Channel.n°5
Shannon is also explicit in concerning this assump­
tion: "We consider a communication system and an observer
(or auxiliary device) who can see both what is sent and what 
is recovered (with errors due to noise)."66 Figure & in 
Shannon’s book as well as Cherry’s illustration (Figure 2 
below) emphasize the importance of this "Observation Channel." 
This assumption is important to behavioral researchers, 
since, as Cherry points out,
In physical, including psychological, experiments, 
observations are made and reported upon; and the nature 
of the reports, the theory set up, will depend upon 
whether the observer is completely outside the phenome­
non he observes, or whether he himself is part of it.
... In many laboratory experiments the observer may 
disturb the phenomenon by his very observations; or he 
may need to make changes, or alter some situation, before 
the phenomenon comes to light. But the experiments
65lbld. t p. m .
^Shannon and Weaver, p. 6$, emphasis added.
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upon "communication" are particularly prone to disturb­
ance by the observer as when, for instance, this observer 
is one of the communicants.6/
2, Shannon^ theory is a statistical one; that is, 
it concerns only average, microscopic, properties of a 
system, not specific momentary properties.
Figure 2
possible
sent
messages
Obs erver's 
channel 
or meta­
channel
Noise
Source Receiverapparatus
Channel, 
or medium
External
observer
Adapted from Cherry, p. 177.
Some elaboration of this assumption is provided by 
Luce, who says,
The information model for noisy systems is concerned 
with limiting behavior— with infinitely long messages 
and delays. Subjects invariably deal with finite mes­
sages and introduce comparatively short delays. It does 
not immediately follow that the model gives bad approxi­
mations for such cases, but it does suggest that caution 
is needed.69
Chronbach also indicates that the Shannon measure is not
6?Cherry, "On the Validity, . pp. 176-177, 
6aIbid., p. 17S 6 L̂uce, p. 52,
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designed for the analysis of finite sequences of behavior, 
and observes that "the probability of a correct guess , . • 
is described by the Shannon measure only in the limit.1170
3, From long series of past observations it is as­
sumed that the external observer has made good estimates 
of the probabilities (frequencies) of occurrence of the 
various transmitted message signals x» received signals 
Xt and interfering noise. Further, it is assumed that 
the noise source(s) can be identified ("singled out") 
and their statistical properties specified by the ob­
server. or, in certain simple cases, that noise is ab­sent . 7 j
In many situations, it is possible for the external 
observer to determine the statistical properties of the 
source prior to the experiment, but it may occasionally hap­
pen that the experimenter is unable to do this. The assump­
tion, however, requires the external observer to know the 
statistical properties of both the source and the receiver, 
and with a good deal of accuracy. It follows, of course, that 
only the external observer can be capable of any complete 
description of the statistics of the system.
The identification of the noise sources may pose an 
extremely difficult problem in many experimental situations, 
particularly those in which the human being is considered a 
communication channel. It should be noted that the assumption 
does not require that any particular bodily organ be identified
70Chronbach, p, 72.
7̂ Cherry, "On the Validity. , . p. 17#-#
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as the source of noise, or that any name at all be attached 
to that source. Nevertheless, it does require that the 
source(s) of noise be statistically identified and separated 
with respect to their effects on the communication system.
4. It is assumed that, a priori, the two communi­
cants operate with an agreed set of message signs, or 
alphabet, having certain definite frequencies of occur­
rence. It is assumed that these frequencies remain un­
changed with the passage of time; that is, that the statistics of the situation are stationary,72
Luce again further emphasized the situation:
The model supposes that the destination is aware of 
and uses a good deal of the available statistical in­
formation about the source and the noise. In many 
actual and experimental situations, subjects have only 
the crudest knowledge of these probabilities, and even 
when they do know them, there is no a priori certainty 
that they will use this information.
The fifth and last basic assumption of information 
theory Cherry states as follows:
5. It is assumed that this alphabet of signs x-j, 
x2, Xn (signals, ensemble of messages, coding system) remains unchanged.74
Here again, the external observer may find difficul­
ties. Although it is usually possible to specify at the 
beginning of an experiment which symbols are to be employed, 
there is no guarantee that the operators will continue to 
use the same ensemble throughout the experiment. That is, 
it may prove convenient (from a point of view which would
72Ibid., p. 173. 73luce, p. 52,
7i*Cherry, n0n the Validity * , , ,l? p. 173
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require, for the sake of ”simplicity,” that some symbols 
be omitted from consideration in order to reduce probabil­
ity computations) to substantially reduce the number of 
symbols which are thought of as nprobable.” Or, it is also 
conceivable that subjects may become confused, and add more 
symbols to the experimental ensemble* Cherry, moreover, 
alludes to further problems with respect to this assumption 
when the concept of ”continuous information” is introduced. 
This concept, he says, is an ”unreality.”75>76
This statement of the assumptions of information 
theory ends the discussion of the theory per se which has 
been dealt with in the present chapter. The next ehapter 
will undertake an examination of the various applications 
of information theory in communication research.
Ibid*. p, tgy.
7̂ For a concise discussion of this point* which is 
beyond the scope of this paper, see pp. 137-133 of Cherry’s 
article.
CHAPTER III
APPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION THEORY 
IN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
An examination of the literature in the behavioral 
sciences which employs information theory techniques as a 
method of data analysis or as a model for experimental re­
search reveals four pertinent features about those applica­
tions :
1. Few of the applications are to problems tradi­
tionally classed as communication; this was predicted 
by Miller and Frick in their 1949 paper.'
2. The applications do not generally use the funda­
mental theorem relating channel capacity, the statisti­
cal structure of the source, and the transmission 
rate. ...
3. The theory has not really generated new problems 
to be studied in psychology* Rather it has caused re­
examination and reformulation of old problems.* In some 
cases . . .  it has permitted several apparently dispar­
ate effects to be included within a single theoretical
^Miller and Frick, p. 324.
2Some investigators do not feel that this is the case. 
Referring to a technique for measuring the accuracy of stim­
ulus identification based on information theory suggested by 
Garner and Hake ("The Amount of Information in Absolute Judge­
ments," Psychological Review, 5$ /795J7 t 446-459, Attneave 
says:
The Garner-Hake method opened a whole new area of ex­
perimentation and further provided the basis for McGill’s 
development of a method of multivariate analysis which 
is the informational analogue of analysis of variance 
components. (Fred Attneave, Applications of Information 
Theory to Psychology /lew York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1 9 5 :2 7 7  p .  4 3 1 7
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framework. The fact that old problems are being treated 
does not, unfortunately, mean that new data are not 
needed. A published experiment rarely fulfills the ex­
act conditions another worker would like. More import­
ant, the isolation of sequential dependencies requires a 
new analysis of the raw data, and it is very rare indeed 
to find extensive publications of raw data.
4. Like a new mistress, information theory seemed 
at first elusive and full of promise. She was the justi­
fication for both intensity and irresponsibility: a
thing of perfection requiring little more than some ex­
perimentation to bear fruit. With the passing years, a 
more '’mature’1 if less exciting relationship has developed.2
These four generalizations are suggestive of the need 
for a scheme of classification of informational analyses.
While a number of such systems have been used by various in­
vestigators ,4- »6 it shall be convenient for the purposes of
this paper to employ a division suggested as a possibility by 
R, D. Luce.?>^ The divisions are based on the fact that 
information theory has introduced methods for dealing with
3Luce, pp. 51-52. ^Garner.
5Binder and Violin, pp. 29-54. P̂ierce,
?Luce, p. 53.
^In fact, a number of other factors enter into this 
choice of divisions. It is often convenient for psycholo­
gists to classify the uses of informational models on the 
basis of the mathematical level of the analysis (i.e., uni- 
variare, bivariare, multivariare, etc.). Binder and Violin, 
however, point out a number of errors in the work of other 
researchers resulting from the misuse of such models. Rather 
than become involved in a discussion of these mathematical 
models, the scheme adopted is based on the type of problem 
to which the analysis is applied. For a penetrating discus­
sion of five informational models, and some of the problems 
in other research, see Binder and Violin.
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three central concepts:
1 * Sequential dependencies, These studies would 
Include applications which use information theory to deal 
with sequential data, or with problems of redundancy. These 
types of applications are examined in the first section of 
this chapter.
2. Noise, Applications which use the theorems for 
noisy communication to cope with problems where stimulus 
and response are not perfectly correlated fall into this 
category. These are discussed in the second section,
3. Capacity and transmission. Studies which employ 
the central theorems of information theory concerning rates 
of transmission and capacity are considered in the third 
section.
Sequential Dependencies
Probably the most widely known of all of the types 
of applications of information theory are those in the area 
of sequential dependencies. This type of research is based 
on the calculation of information and redundancy in a se­
quence of symbols.
In the last chapter (see p. 27), the concept of re­
dundancy in a sequence of symbols was briefly discussed.
This aspect of information theory forms the basis for the 
analysis of sequential dependencies. To further clarify 
the basic issue, Attneave says:
3 B
A fundamental idea in information theory is that of 
"kke stochastic process. A stochastic process is any 
system which gives rise to a sequence of symbols to 
which probability laws apply. It may be extremely sim­
ple, like a tossed coin, ... or extremely complex, as 
in the case of a sequence of musical notes written by a 
composer, or a sequence of letters making up English 
text. A stochastic process is said to be ergodic if the 
probability laws which characterize it remain constant 
for all parts of the sequence* Ergodieity, or at least 
an approximation thereto, is usually a necessary condi­
tion for the application of information measures to a sequence. , . .
A stochastic process is characterized by some degree 
of redundancy between 0 percent and 100 percent, At the 
zero-redundancy extreme, all the symbols generated have 
equal probability of occurrence, and nothing that we may 
know about the history of the sequence makes the next 
symbol any more predictable. At the opposite extreme, at 100 percent redundancy, symbols are generated in an 
altogether lawful and regular sequence, such that one 
can predict with complete certainty what the next symbol 
will be. . . * The most interesting sequences fail some­
where between these two extremes. , . .9
One of the first of the studies employing the concept 
of sequential dependencies was conducted by Shannon.^® He 
demonstrated a series of stochastic process generating "arti­
ficial languages" with probability laws taken from the Eng­
lish language. As the order of the probability laws taken 
from English is increased, the series of symbols thereby 
generated rapidly approaches spoken and written English. 
Shannon gives the following illustrations?
1• 2ero-order approximation to English* A process
Âttneave, pp. 13-14.
^Shannon and Weaver, pp. 43-44.
selecting symbols (letters) from the English alphabet (of 
26 letters and one space) completely at random might gener­
ate a sequence such as:
IFOML RIXXKHRJFFJUJ ZLFWCFWKCYJ FFJEVVKC0Q3GHYD
ZPAAMKBZAACIS ZIJQD.
Such a sequence makes no sense at all to speakers of 
English*
2* First-order approximation* In this ease, the 
selections are still independent, but with the frequencies 
of English text. That is, Shannon generated a sequence 
of letters based on their probabilities of occurrence in 
English texts. His example is as follows:
GCRO HLI RGWR NMIELWIS EU LL HBSESEHYA TH EEI
ALHENHTTPA C0BTTYA HAH BRL.
As in the case of the zero-order approximation, this 
is not meaningful to English users.
3. Second-order approximation. In this case, Shan­
non constructed the sequence based on the probabilities that 
anv two symbols (called ’’digrams”) will occur.^ That is, 
given one letter, Shannon determined, on a probabilistic
^ ’’Shannon constructed this sequence, and those of 
higher order, by an ingenious short-cut technique. He be­
gan by selecting at random a letter from a book, and record­
ing it. Opening the book at another page, he read until 
this letter occurred, and recorded the succeeding one. He 
then searched for the second letter on another page, and 
recorded the one succeeding it, and so on.” Attneave, p. 16.
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basis, what the next letter was. The sequence generated 
was:
ON IE ANTSOUTHINYS ARE T INGTORE ST BE 3 DEAMX
ACHIN D IL0NA3IVE TUCGCWE AT TEASONAME FU30 TIZIN
ANDX TOBI SEAGE CTI3BE.
At this point, the emergence of some familiarity can 
be seen. For example, the English words T*on,n "are," "be,” 
"at,” and "Andy” all occur in the sequence.
4. Third-order approximation. In generating this 
sequence, Shannon used the same method as above, except that 
each pair of letters just recorded was used in determining 
the next one. The structures are called "trigrams,” and the 
example Shannon gives is:
IN HO 1ST LAT WHEY CRATICE FROURE BIRS GROCID
P0NDEH0ME OF BEMOKSTRURES OF THE REPTACIN IS
REGOACTIONA OF CRE.
While none of the sequences are English, it can be 
seen that the last is a better "approximation to English” 
than the preceding ones; i.e., it is "more" English than 
the rest.
5. First-order word approximation. At this point 
Shannon suggests that a jump to word approximations might 
be easier and better than to continue with tetragtam,
. . * , N-gram letter approximations. For the first-order 
word approximation words were chosen independently with 
their appropriate frequencies:
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REPRESENTING AND SPEEDILY IS AN GOOD APT OR COME 
GAR DIFFERENT NATURAL HERE HE THE A IN COME THE TO OF 
TO EXPERT GRAY COME TO FURNISHES THE LINE MESSAGE 
HAD BE THESE. '
6. Second-order word approximation. Digram frequen­
cies for words were used in constructing the following:
THE HEAD AND IN FRONTAL ATTACK ON AN ENGLISH WRITER
THAT THE CHARACTER OF THIS POINT IS THEREFORE ANOTHER
METHOD FOR THE LETTERS THAT THE TIME OF WHO EVER TOLD
THE PROBLEM FOR AN UNEXPECTED.
With respect to these approximations Attneave ob­
serves ,
The progression of these samples toward English is 
striking* Under (4 ) we find groups of letters which 
obviously could be words "grocid pondenome" is almost 
worthy of Lewis Carroll), and in (6) the discourse ap­
proaches a sort of schizoid plausibility.12
Somewhat capriciously, Pierce adds:
To me, deamy has a pleasant sound; I would take 
nit’s a deamy idea” in a complimentary sense. On the 
other hand, I*d hate to be denounced as ilonasive. I 
would not like to be called groeid. , , , Pondenome. 
whatever it may be, is at least dignified. . . .
I find jj&T disquieting. I feel that the English 
writer is in mortal peril, yet I cannot come to his aid 
because the latter part of the message is garbled.'3
Some of the first applications of information theory 
were to the problem of the calculation of the redundancy of 
written English, While the number of possible combinations
^Attneave, p. 17*
13Pierce, pe 262.
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of letter sequences in English precludes the possibility of 
direct measurement of redundancy of English beyond very low** 
order dependencies,^ several indirect techniques for the 
estimation of redundancy have been developed. As Garner 
notes, however:
All of the indirect techniques have used the assump­
tion, in some form, that intelligent adults can and do 
use the statistical properties of printed English, and 
that, therefore, performance measure can be used to es­
timate the redundancy of languages.^5,1o
In principle all we need to do is calculate 
p (.i/i i ,i?, . . . , jLjj) t̂ or all the letters and for all 
N-tuples of letters and blanks which might precede. Prom 
this we could compute ^  (bj. ».i)loggP(j/bi),
where b̂  denotes a typical block of M-1 successive let­
ters preceding j. Were these known, then we could 
estimate the entropy of the sample to any desired accur­
acy using the fact that H ** ~I.
difficulty becomes apparent when we realize that 
a 27 letter alphabet yields 27^ possible 1-grams. Of
course, many of these are impossible in English, but 
even were we to assume that, say, only one percent were
possible, there would still be 1,966 cases to be exam­ined with M * 3 , and 53,144 for 1 - 4 .
Nonetheless, can be computed for very small values 
of K, and Shannon"”reports that F-j « 4.14 bits/letter,
2̂ ** 3*56 bits/letter, ^3 “ 3«3 bits letter." Luce., 
pp. 53-54.
^Garner, p. 220.
^This assumption has been verified for both letters 
(M.S. Kaysner, M.E. Tresselt, S. Adler, and K.A. Schoenberg, 
"Correlations Between Subjects Generated Letter Frequencies 
and Observed Frequencies in English," Psvchonomic Science. 1
Shannon used two methods In his first estimation of 
redundancy of English, In the first of these he generated 
approximations to English based on published tables, and 
calculated the redundancy* The second method was to randomly 
delete certain percentages of the letters in a written pass­
age, and then ask subjects to reconstruct the original message. 
On the basis of these two studies, Shannon estimated the re­
dundancy of English at about 50 per cent and the entropy at 
2.3 bits per letter.^
Shannon also developed a different sort of procedure 
for estimating the upper and lower bounds of redundancy.
Again, he used passages of English as material, but his 
subjects were asked to guess each successive letter. In 
guessing the first letter of the sentence, the subject 
could use only his knowledge of the probabilities of occur­
rence of the letters of the English alphabet, but as he con­
tinued to guess the succeeding letters, the order of prob­
ability increased accordingly. He continued guessing on 
each letter until he was correct. Shannon then recorded 
the number of guesses required to get each letter in the
ZT9647, 295-296) and words (Eoy Omer Freedle, ”Response Bias 
in a Modified Shannon Guessing Game ,** Proceedings of the 
73rd Annual Convention of the American 'Psychological Associa­
tion. j % 5'J. 11—12), although in the latter case it was stipu­
lated that at least four words should precede each guess.
^Claude E. Shannon, 1 Prediction and Entropy of Prin­
ted English,” Bell System Technical Journal, 30 (1951)»
5O—64#
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passage correct* A short sample is shown below, when the 
first line is the original text and the second line is the 
number of guesses required for each letter:
THERE IS MO R EV ERSE OH A MOTORCYCLE A FRIEND
1115112112111511711121321227111141111131^61311
Shannon gives what is called the "identical twin assump­
tion ĵ 8 that is, that if the subject had an "identical twin" 
who would guess the letters in exactly the same manner as 
the subject himself, the number of guesses could be used as 
a code, and by transmitting the number of guesses required 
to correctly ascertain each letter, the identical twin could 
reconstruct the original message. As Garner then states:
Such a procedure clearly leads to a lower bound for 
redundancy, since the distribution of correct guesses 
can become more restricted only if there is in fact more 
consistency to the language itself* If the guesser 
fully uses all of the properties of the language, his 
distribution of correct guesses will be limited by the 
redundancy of the language itself. If he does not use 
all of the redundancy available, his distribution of 
guesses may be greater but cannot be smaller, except 
by pure luck. In other words, the distribution of 
guesses is limited by the redundancy of the language* 
Even if the subject uses all of the redundancy in the 
language this procedure still gives a lower-bound esti­
mate because it takes into account only the order of 
guessing, not the probability of each letter in the language itself.19,20
^Garner, p. 221,
19Ibid.
2^Attneave points out that n . . . the loose-jointed- 
ness of this transformation is attributable to the fact that 
even a hypothetically ideal subject, in guessing at a partic­
ular letter, does not reveal in his guesses . . . any exact 
distribution of probabilities for the next letter, but only
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By a mathematical argument which will not be recapitulated
here, Shannon also found a lower bound for redundancy.2^
From this and other data, Attneave concludes,
It appears that in a long passage of English text,
, . . the average amount of new information contributed 
by a letter must settle down to something like one bit, 
or possibly less. This is in direct contrast to the 
log 27 ® 4.76 bits which each letter would contain if 
all the symbols were equally likely and no sequential 
dependencies existed. Thus a conservative estimate of 
the redundancy of English is about 75 percent.22
An alternative method for finding an upper bound for 
the entropy of letters in a sequence, which utilised a new 
informational statistic (called the ncoefficient of constraint")
the order of certain of these probabilities." (Attneave,
p. 3jn Further, Garner notes three factors which enter into 
the adequacy of this technique: (1)" . , . the subject
must be skilled in his knowledge and use of the statistical 
properties of the language for the lower bound estimate to 
be near the true value of redundancy." (2) " . . . it is 
necessary to ensure that the subject have no prior knowl­
edge of the language samples being used," (3) "While it is 
not necessary that the subjects be sampled, it is essential 
that the language be sampled," (Garner, pp. 221-222),
2 T̂he bounds Shannon obtained for the Nth order 
entropy, F̂ ,- were given as
i«2? ~ H N 1=27 N 1
(£i - Pi+1 )i log i - Fk< 13 Pi log*l where
Pi stands for the proportion of times 1 guesses are re­
quired to identify the Nth letter of a passage. A more com­
plete mathematical treatment may be found in Luce, pp. 57-$.
22Attneave, pp. 33-35.
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was devised by Newman and Gerstman.23 Again, the mathemati­
cal derivation of their measure will be omittedj2̂  however, 
their results, based on entirely objective observations,2  ̂
gave a value of 4*00 bits for the uncertainty of single let­
ter distributions, and 2.12 bits for the sum of contingent 
uncertainties up to 11 letters, thus placing the relative 
redundancy on the basis of the contingency terms at 52 per 
cent.
Noise
The second category of applications of information 
theory to communication research are those concerned with 
noise. In theory, this includes all of those situations in 
which the ’’stimulus and response are not perfectly correla­
ted, e.g., where there are errors of some type.”2? The most 
obvious of such applications, it seems, would be those con­
cerning speech intelligibility under noisy conditions. It 
is somewhat surprising, then, that almost no studies have
23e. B. Newman and L. S. Gerstman, ”A New Method for 
Analyzing Printed English,” Journal of Experimental Psych­
ology. 44 (1952), 114-125.
2Huce points out that the formulations are based on 
an assumption as yet unproved, and notes that Newman and 
Gerstman themselves state that there are limiting cases in 
which the assumption has been shown not to apply. Luce, 
pp. 59-60.
^3Attneave, p. 37. ^Garner, p. 232.
2?Luce, p. 53.
47
dealt directly with speech intelligibility in interpersonal 
communication under noisy conditions and in which noise is 
an independent variable with analysis in terms of informa­
tion transmission. Garner suggests that this might be due 
in part to the problem of word selection, since it is impos­
sible to show that the results obtained are independent of 
language sampling factors.^ Only synthetical data are 
available concerning the transmission of information in 
noise, based primarily on the work of Miller, Heise, and 
Lichten.2  ̂ Garner interprets this evidence as follows:
At T&J low S/N /signal-to-noise7 ratio, there is no information transmission. . . .  As the S/N ratio is 
increased, information transmission also increases.
. . . The data presented here are skimpy for the pur­
pose, but they strongly suggest that there is an asymp­
totic value for each S/N level; that is, for each S/N 
ratio we can specify a channel capacity— a result that 
seems eminently reasonable# Thus we should be able to 
specify the effects of noise by stating a single number 
which is the channel capacity for that noise level,30
Eeplotting the Miller, Heise, and Lichten data with the 
signal-to-noise ratio on the abscissa (rather than the un­
certainty of the test vocabulary), Garner finds that
it is not at all unreasonable to draw a single function 
to represent all of the data— a function which specifies
2®Garner, p. 79,
A, Miller, G, A. Heise, and W. Lichten, ’The 
Intelligibility of Speech as a Function of the Context of 
the Test Materials,” Journal of Experimental Psychology, 
41 (1951), 329-335.
■^Garner, p. .
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a single value of (maximum) information transmission as 
a function of noise level* Furthermore, the intercept 
of the function on the abcissa allows us to state the 
S/N ratio below which no information transmission can 
be obtained— in this case at -16 db.31
And extrapolating the data to 10 bits of information trans­
mission, "the equivalent S/N ratio is +20 db,— suggesting 
that perfect intelligibility occurs at that level."32,33 
In obtaining these estimates, however, Garner makes two 
critical assumptions. First, it was assumed that the re­
sponse uncertainty would be the same as the stimulus uncer­
tainty, and second, that the percent of correct identifica­
tions is the largest single category of responses, and that 
all of the errors are then randomly distributed among the 
other possible alternatives.34,35 While the first of these 
seems reasonable, the second might well be questioned. But 
if the first assumption is incorrect, the effect would be 
that the information transmission estimate would be too
31 Ibid. 32xbid*, p. S3.
33 The upper limit of 10 bits represents an asymtotic 
level, not a discrete break in the function*
3^Garner, p. BO,
35$y way 0f illustration, if it is supposed that 
there are four stimulus categories, a response uncertainty 
of 2,0 bits was assumed* And if, for a given condition, 40 
per cent of the words were correctly identified, it was 
assumed the distribution of responses was 40,20,20, and 20, 
giving a conditional uncertainty of 1.92 bits. Subtracting 
this from the response uncertainty gave an estimated infor­
mation transmission of 0.0B bit. Garner, p. BO,
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high,3^ but as Garner points out, ”it would take consider­
able error of this sort to change the conclusion that infor­
mation transmission increases with an increase in size of 
test vocabulary.”37 if the second assumption were incorrect, 
however, the effect would be opposite that of the first, 
since the assumption maximizes the computed conditional uncer­
tainty, thus minimizing the estimated information transmis­
sion.3^ Errors due to the two assumptions should then tend 
to cancel.
A more frequently employed application of information 
theory in the category of noise are those studies in reaction 
time. As stated in Chapter I, however, these studies do not 
fall into what has been traditionally referred to as "commu­
nication,” and hence shall not be dealt with in this paper*39
Capacity and Transmission
Some of the most interesting applications of informa­
tion theory are those in which the theorems are used to
3%his is so since in assuming that response uncer­
tainty is the same as stimulus uncertainty, a maximum pos­
sible value is assumed, since any unequal distribution of 
responses can only lower the value. Garner, p. $1.
37Garner, pp. 81-82. 3^ibid., p. 81.
39several good reviews of informational analyses in 
reaction time studies are already in existence. See, for 
example, Peter D, Bricker, "Information Measurement and Re­
action Time: A Review,” Information Theory in Psychology,
ed. Henery Quaselor (Glencoe 111.: The Free’ Press, 1955}*
pp. 350-359.
determine rates of transmission and capacity* Perhaps the 
most widely known of these applications have been based on 
the assumption that the human being ean be considered as a 
communication channel. Cherry says: "Comparison between
a human operator and a communication channel is today com­
monplace j the stimuli represent ’in-put signals’ applied to 
his sense-organs, while his overt responses represent ’out­
put signals’; the human operator represents the ’transdu­
cer,’”^  As a number of investigators have pointed out, 
however, this position is not altogether adequate for all 
situations,41*42 and Hake has further stated that a measure 
of transmitted information is meaningless unless an opera­
tional definition of each experimental context is also sup­
plied,^ This issue will be taken up in the "Conclusions” 
in more detail; a recount of some of the major ideas is given 
here to illustrate two common approaches taken by researchers.
According to Luce:
Two procedures to estimate the capacity seem possible. 
First estimate the channel capacity from whatever 
physical, physiological, and psychological facts that 
are known to be relevant to the type of transmission 
being employed. Second, by varying certain variables 
and employing diverse coding schemes, find the maximum 
amount of information that a person can be caused to 
handle* This, by the fundamental theorem of information 
theory, affords a lower bound on the capacity.44
40cherry, "On the Validity • . . ," p. 17$,
41Masono Toda, "Information-Receiving Behavior of 
Man,” Psychological Review, 63 (1956), 204-212,
^Chronbach. 43cherry, "On the Validity . . . ," p. 1
44x,uce, p. 71,
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Using the first procedure to obtain an upper bound of 
the channel capacity of human being has been somewhat prob­
lematic in a number of respects. Luce suggests that
possibly part of the difficulty in obtaining a satisfac­
tory estimate by the first procedure is the lack of an 
adequate model for what happens functionally within a per­
son when he is processing information. Thus, Independent 
measurements on most of the ” channel"— which is surely 
not homogeneous in its properties— cannot be had. As a 
result, the estimates which have been made are in a 
sense only concerned with the peripheral aspects of the channel.45
The first method has resulted in upper bounds of approximately 
10,000 bits per second, but it is thought that this estimate 
is considerably higher than the actual capacity,4̂  particu­
larly in view of the estimate of the lower bound based on 
the second procedure.
On the basis of a phonetic analysis of spoken lang­
uage assuming that a vocabulary of 5,000 words is distribu­
ted equi-probably and that these words are spoken at 1.5 
words per second, the information transmission rate is 1# 
bits per second
This work has thus far reviewed the historical and 
mathematical backgrounds of information theory, stated the 
assumptions of the theory, and briefly discussed previous 
research in the three major areas of applications of
45ibid. 
47ibid.
46 Ibid.
information theory in communication research.
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Other Studies
This paper would he incomplete without some reference 
to a considerable number of studies purporting to use infor­
mation theory and informational concepts but which cannot be 
reasonably said to fall into the areas of application hereto­
fore discussed. The principle reason for this writer’s in­
ability to classify such studies into any of those three 
areas is that many employ bits and pieces of the mathematics 
of information theory, apparently arbitrarily selected with­
out reference to the communication model which information 
theory presupposes. Moreover, a large portion of the studies 
to be discussed here have little or nothing to do with any 
part of information theory beyond the attachment of the 
label in the title.
Information theorists have been lamenting such appli­
cations since they first appeared, but the number of them 
seems to have increased rather than decreased. It is with 
respect to these types of applications that Luce has been 
previously quoted:
Like a new mistress, information theory seemed at 
first elusive and full of promise. She was the justifi­
cation for both intensity and irresponsibility: a thing
of perfection requiring little more than some experi­
mentation to bear fruit,A®
^Luee, pp. 51-52,
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Unfortunately, the more ’’mature" relationship Luce suggests 
later developed seems to have materialized in not all re­
searchers. As Weaver and Weaver point out, "It is not dif­
ficult to find, either in published reports or in oral dis­
cussion, examples of statements that imply, and sometimes 
say, that Shannonfs formula can be used to measure the amount 
of meaning in a message, either written or spoken."^ Their 
report very convincingly argues the understatement that "if 
computed only on the probability of occurrence of single 
words in a stochastic process, the bit of information has 
less than a one-to-one correspondence with meaning.”
Similarly, other areas of application of information 
theory have come under criticism of a similar sort. Pierce 
says :
I have read a good deal more about information theory 
and psychology than I can or care to remember, Much of 
it was a mere association of new terms with old and 
vague ideas. Presumably the hope was that a stirring 
in of new terras would clarify the old ideas by a sort 
of sympathetic magic.51
For the most part, such applications have only served to
confuse and complicate matters, and little of importance
has resulted from them.
^Carl h. Weaver and Garry L. Weaver, "Speech Commu­
nication and Information Theory," p. 1. University of Mary­
land, Missile System Analysis Group, Applied Physics Lab. 
(Mimeographed.)
5°Ibid., p. 2$. 51 Pierce, p. 229*
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Elsewhere, information theory has been connected with 
biology,^ music,53 fiction writing,5̂  and even the visual 
arts.55 While many of these applications are very interest­
ing, and often informative, their connection to information 
theory per se is at best questionable. In the next chapter 
two of such speculative studies in the area of speech com­
munication shall be analyzed in the same manner as will 
others in the three areas already discussed. The analyses, 
it is hoped, will illustrate the tenuous nature of this sort 
of research.
5^Henery Quastler (ed,), Essays on the Use of Infor­
mation Theory in Biology (Urbana, 111.: University of Illi­
nois Press, 1953).
53r . c. Pinkerton, "Information Theory and Melody," 
Scientific American. 194 (1956), 77-66.
54pierce, pp. 261-64. 55ibid., pp. 264-6 7.
CHAPTER I?
ANALYSES OF STUDIES IN COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
The purpose of the present chapter is to examine 
in detail several common types of applications of infor­
mation theory with respect to the basic assumptions of 
the formal theory as stated in Chapter II. These models 
shall be examined both in general terms and as specific 
approaches in specific experiments. The analyses will 
show whether the models and studies have met the assump­
tions of the theory, and if they have, by what experi­
mental procedures; or if not, what procedures were not 
consistent with the assumptions. The analyses seek to 
show only whether the experimental procedures are consis­
tent with the assumptions of information theory; it should 
be very clear that no attempt shall be made to judge the 
validity of the results or the usefulness of the models 
for research purposes.
Sequential Dependencies
The majority of the studies in communication research 
which emplqy information theory have concentrated on se­
quential dependencies and redundancy* Two basic approaches
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emerge in this category.̂
The first of these are those which follow the tech­
niques and approach of Miller and Selfridge, who explored 
the effects of language redundancy on learning#2
It occurred to them that the fact that ’’meaningful” 
material is more easily remembered than ’nonsense” material 
might be attributable to sequential associations of the 
symbols, and not ”meaningfulness” per se. That is, they 
thought that the greater redundancy (i.e., lower information 
content of ’meaningful” material)^ might contribute to the 
ease of learning. Their stimulus material was statistical
%hil@ it should not be said that the two approaches 
here considered are the only ways in which information theory 
has been employed, the large majority of applications would 
fall into one of the models mentioned here. For a good 
treatment of somewhat more specific categorizations, see 
Luce, "The Theory of Selective Information , . . ,” chps, 
7-13.
2G. A. Miller and Jennifer A. Selfridge, ”Verbal 
Context and the Recall of Meaningful Material,” American 
Journal of Psychology# 63 (1950), 176-185.
•̂ While this experiment may not fall into the class 
which has thus far been termed a ’’communication" study, it 
is included here since, besides being one of the first exper­
imental applications of information theory, techniques were 
developed during the course of the experiment which have be­
come very well known and commonly used. Consideration, then, 
for purposes of orientation and illustration, is provided.
The remainder of the studies deal more specifically with 
communication research,
Ît would be erroneous to equate ”meaningfulness" 
with redundancy, since it is quite possible that highly re­
dundant material may be "nonsensical," or vice versa, Att- 
neave, p. 19 and Garner, p. 275.
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approximations of English, as exampled in Chapter III. In 
constructing the approximations, however, they found that 
Shannon’s method was too laborious and time consuming to be 
used in obtaining higher order approximations, and devised 
a new technique. To construct an Nth order approximation, 
they showed a sequence of N-1 words to a person who was in­
structed to use this sequence in a sentence. Then
the word he used directly after the sequence would be 
added, the first word of the sequence would be dropped, 
and the new (but overlapping) sequence would be pre­
sented to the next person, . . .5
Zero, first, second, third, fourth, and fifth, and seventh 
order approximations to English were constructed in this 
manner, and samples of English text were also used. Each 
order of approximation was represented by lists 10, 2 0, 3 0, 
and 50 words in length. Twenty subjects heard the words 
read aloud once, and later attempted to repeat them. The 
per cent of words correctly recalled was then plotted on 
the ordinate against the order of approximation. It was 
shown that the greater the degree of contextual constraint, 
the easier it was to remember the material. At about the 
fifth order approximation* however, the curve leveled off, 
indicating that beyond this order the effect of the associa­
tions was negligible. Discussing the implications of their
55Miller and Selfridge, p. 1&3
5$
findings, Miller and Selfridge add;
The results indicate that meaningful material is 
easy to learn, not because it is meaningful per se but 
because it preserves the short range associations that 
are familiar to the 3s. Nonsense materials that retain 
these short range associations are also easy to learn.
By shifting the problem from "meaning” to degree of con­
textual constraint the whole area is reopened to experi­
mental investigation.®
While their results have been confirmed by van de
Geer^ and Sharp,̂  both Garner^ and Attneave^ argue that
their conclusion may have gone too far, since a subsequent
study by Marks and Jack^ found that if the subjects were
scored on memory span,
although the average span of words correctly recalled 
increased steadily with the order of approximation to 
English, the greatest increase . . . occurred between 
the fifth-order approximation and English text. Marks 
and Jack conclude that meaning does have a facilitating 
effect on immediate memory, over and above the reduction
6Ibid.. p. 104.
^J. P. van de Geer, ,rPsychologische Toepassingen 
van de Inforraatie-theorie," Ned. Ti.idschr. Psvchol., 12
(1957), pp. 295-320, 333-357. (Cited in Garner, p. 269.)
Ĥ. C. Sharp, "Effect of Contextual Constraint Upon 
Recall of Verbal Passages," American Journal of Psychology. 
71 (1958), 568-572. (Cited in Garner," pV 26977 Sharp is 
criticized, however, by Binder and Woiin (p. 43) for using 
a formula which ignores most of the characteristics of the 
Markovian source in computing the amount of information when 
the appropriate model is "clearly Markovian."
Ĝarner, pp. 269-2?0. ^°Attneave, pp. 18-19.
11M. R. Marks and G. Jack, "Verbal Context and Memory 
Span for Meaningful Material," American Journal of Psychol­
ogy. 65 (1952), pp. 298-300. (Cited in Attneave, p. 18.)
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which it entails.^
Since the primary concern in the present paper, how­
ever , is not the specific results of experiments but some 
methodological problems encountered in the course of the 
utilization of information models, it will be convenient to 
turn to Garner's discussion of these p r o b l e m s . 3̂
Examining this study with respect to the assumptions 
of information theory, a number of issues emerge. The first 
assumption of information theory (i.e., that the external 
observer must express the events in a "meta-language”— he must 
be able to describe both ends of the channel) appears to be 
easily satisfied. The observers knew, of course, the stimu­
lus words, and recorded the subject’s responses.
The second assumption, that the theory is concerned 
only with average, macroscopic properties of a system (and 
that therefore the results obtained must be expressed as 
averages) is not so simply satisfied. Only two groups of 
ten subjects each were used in the experiment. While Miller 
and Selfridge hold that "a larger number of subjects would 
not have reduced the irregularities in the results, for most 
of the variability seemed attributable to sampling peculiari­
ties in the lists themselves,"^ strictly speaking, such a
^Attneave, pp. 16-19, ^Garner, pp. 273*276.
1 Sailer and Self ridge, p. 161.
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small number of subjects could not give valid results in 
terms of meeting this assumption* Cherry says that the 
results must be "averaged over many subjects who are within 
the language group"^ in order for the assumption to be 
met. Clearly, twenty subjects could not be called a large 
number, and since only four presentations of each order of 
approximation were given, the assumption cannot be met.
Assumption three states that the external observer 
must have mad© estimates of the message signals, received 
signals, and the noise. Since the experimenters knew vir­
tually in toto all that was sent and received, the assump­
tion is satisfied.
The fourth assumption necessitates that the message 
signals and their probabilities are known to the communi­
cants, and that they remain unchanged in time. As noted in 
Chapter III (p. 43), experimental evidence has been found 
supporting the assumption that users of a language have a 
"built-in" knowledge of the statistics of their language, 
and that they will use this knowledge in a situation where 
it Is required.^ With respect to learning, however, the
1^Cherry, "On the . . .," p* 166.
^In some types of experimental situations, subject 
may not use this knowledge to their fullest advantage* This 
problem is discussed by Harold Hake, "The Perception of Fre­
quency of Occurrence and the Development of ’Expectancy* in 
Human Experimental Subjects," Information Theory in Psychol­
ogy. pp. 257-277*
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satisfaction of this assumption is somewhat questionable*
A number of investigators have noted that in learning situa­
tions the conditions of the test do not remain stationary 
with time; that is, as the subject learns, his ensemble of 
signals changes,*17,16 clearly, such learning took place in 
the Miller and Selfridge study, and hence the assumption can­
not be said to be satisfied.
Assumption five, which states that the alphabet of 
signs remains unchanged, is satisfied for each list and 
approximation.
A second method of employing the notions of redundancy 
and constraint involves the deletion of certain words from 
context, and requiring subjects to replace t h e m . 9̂ a number 
of such experiments have been carried out, although only oc­
casionally is an informational analysis attempted. One of 
the more interesting of these studies was conducted by Shep­
ard.2 *̂ He noted that the rate of production of words in a
^Cherry, M0n the Validity . . , p, 179.
^Luee, p. 50.
^Several experiments of this type have been conduc­
ted using letters as the unit deleted. The results of this 
type of experiment generally show that the accuracy with 
which words can be replaced is much less than that for let­
ters. A review of some of these experiments is given in 
Garner, pp. 261-6?.
20Ro ger N. Shepard, "Production of Constrained Asso­
ciates and the Informational Uncertainty of the Constraint," 
American Journal of Psychology. 76 (1963), p. 216.
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given category (such as "famous artists") may be dependent
on the number of words which fall into that category, and
further, that the initial rate of production of words in a
large category ("famous people") is greater than that for a
small category ("famous artists"). If the words in a given
category are taken as a source-ensemble, then the uncertainty
of such a category could be computed. Usually, however, the
category is so large that it is not feasible to determine
the number of words by exhaustive counting* But
to the extent, however, that the initial rate of listing 
is determined by N, that number, and hence the uncer­
tainty, could be "estimated from the initial rate. For 
example, the degree of statistical constraint exerted 
upon a given word by its surrounding context could be 
determined simply by (a) deleting the given word from 
its context and (b) measuring the initial rate at which 
Ss produce guesses as to what the missing word might 
t>e. ‘
As he pointed out, however, the alternative words are not 
equally likely to be written down by the subjects, since 
some members of the categories are more apt to be thought 
of first (i.e., some people are more famous than others).
This study attempted to theoretically and experimentally 
examine how the rate of production depends on the uncer­
tainty when the variation that exists in the probabilities 
of the alternative elements is taken into account*
Shepard selected 36 different newspaper passages
21Ibid,
containing minimum number of proper names and numbers*
One word was then randomly chosen from each of the passages 
and these were deleted from the original text material. 
Then, for each of the 36 passages, 1, 2, 4, 6 , 10, and 40 
words of context from the original material was supplied 
along with a blank space where the deleted word appeared in 
the text. Each subject was then presented, in random order 
with 13 of the cards (one with only a blank, or 0-context, 
and two for each of the remaining degrees of context).
After explaining the source of the material and the method 
of construction, the subjects were directed to list, in 
five minutes, all of the words they could think of which 
might occur in the blank. The number of words recorded 
during each 1/2-minute interval was recorded.
To obtain a measure of uncertainty with which the
rate of listing words could be compared, Shepard used a
letter-guessing technique such as that employed by Shan- 
22non. The analysis showed that when the average number of 
words per subject is cumulatively plotted as a function of 
time (i.e., the average rate) for each of the contextual 
conditions,
the results are consistent with the notion that the 
inclusion of more context further limits the number
22Shepard’s method differed in some minor respects 
from this original one, but is fundamentally the same.
of available alternatives from which the missing word 
might be drawn and therefore decreases the rate of list­ing those alternatives.23
Shepard continues by discussing predictions based on two 
models, one of which assumes an equtprobable word distri­
bution while the other assumes a Zipf-like distribution 
and concludes that the Zipf-like distribution is the more 
adequate model•
Examining this study with respect to the assumptions 
of information theory, somewhat more consistency can be 
seen than in the Miller-Selfridge study. The first assump­
tion, that the external observer must be able to describe 
both ends of the channel, is clearly met. The source- 
enserabl© (the newspaper messages) were completely known to 
him, as well as the subjects’ responses.
The second assumption, that the theory is concerned 
only with average, macroscopic properties of a system, is
^Shepard, p. 221.
24G. K, Zipf has suggested that when the number of 
times a given word is used in a long sample of prose is 
plotted against the rank-ordered frequency of occurrence 
(decreasing), the result, on logarithmic paper, is a straight 
line with slope -1. (G, K. Zipf, Human Behavior and the
Principle of Least Effort /Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley
Pub. Co., Inc., 194̂ 7). In Shepard’s experiment, the re­
sults appear to be fairly consistent with Zipf1s hypothesis. 
It has been shown, however, that Zipf’s function is not an 
adequate description of word-distribution at the extreme 
ends of the scale* A modification, based on informational 
concepts, has been suggested by Benoit Mandelbrot, "An In­
formational Theory of the Statistical Structure of Language," 
Communication Theory, ed. Willis Jackson (London: Butter-
worths, 1953],V^b-5d2 .
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more clearly satisfied in this study than the last, A total 
of 234 cards were used in a counterbalanced design with two 
groups totaling 16 subjects. While there may be some ques­
tion that an adequate number of subjects was employed, that 
each of the subjects was asked to guess the deleted word on 
16 different cards, and the results were averaged for both 
the subjects and the contextual conditions is consistent 
with Cherryrs suggestion that even a relatively small number 
of subjects could give adequate estimations providing the 
results were averaged over a sufficiently large number of
trials.25
To meet the third assumption, that the probabilities 
of the signals are known to the observer, it is only neces­
sary that the experimenter knew all of the stimulus contexts 
and the number of words deleted. Noise is assumed negligi­
ble.
The fourth assumption, that the message signals and 
their probabilities are known to the communicants and that 
they remain unchanged in time, is dealt with by noting, as 
previously, that users of English have a "built-in” knowl­
edge of the structure of the language and the probabilities 
of occurrence of its elements. The effects of learning 
appear to be irrelevant since it is doubtful that the subjects
^Cherry, "On the Validity , . « p. 163.
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would alter their guessing significantly from one deletion 
context to another if the contexts are drawn, as they were, 
from different sources. On the other hand, it is difficult 
to rule out the effects of learning from a theoretical view­
point, since some learning may have occurred, and its effects 
are indeterminable. As Cherry notes, however,
We may nevertheless take ensemble-averages, on the 
assumption that an ensemble of operators will change, 
or learn, in nearly-like manner, under the same test 
conditions,
Since Shepard did exactly this, and the ancillary assumption 
seems reasonably justified, the fourth assumption is also 
met.
Assumption five, that the alphabet of signs remains 
unchanged, is clearly satisfied if no foreign or ’’new15 words 
are used, a 11 practical" assumption*
Thus this study appears to meet all of the assump­
tions of information theory, if only indirectly through 
several additional assumptions about human beings. The prob­
lems in accepting some of the additional assumptions shall 
be discussed later.
Noise
The second category of uses of information theory 
in interpersonal communication research is that in which
26Ibid., p, 179.
67
noise plays a central role. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, however, little of the research in which noise is 
an independent variable relates directly to interpersonal 
communication. Those studies that do so relate appear 
primarily to be audio psychophysical threshold experiments 
or variations. Such a study, previously discussed, is one 
by Miller, Heise, and Lichten.2  ̂ As they point out,
There are three classes of variables involved in an 
articulation test: the personnel. talkers and listen­
ers j the test materials, syllables, words, sentences 
or continuous discourse; and the communication equip­
ment, rooms. microphones, amplifiers, radios, earphones,
etc* ®
Virtually all of the experiments utilizing information 
measures, as Miller Heise and Lichten*s, are concerned with 
the second of these.
They conducted their study as follows:
A random noise voltage^ was introduced at the lis­
teners 1 earphones, and the signal-to-noise ratio was varied 
by changing the level of the noise and leaving the voice 
level constant. Three types of test material were used: 
digits, sentences, and nonsense syllables. Two subjects, 
familiar with the design of the study, located in different 
rooms connected only by the electronic communication chan­
nel, were used tnroughout the experiment, alternately as
^Miller, Heise, and Lichten. 2^lbid,, p. 329 
29100-7,000 Hz,
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listener and speaker* Six signal-to-noise ratios were used 
(-12, -6 , 0 , +6 , +12, +1$ db) with six sizes of test vocabu­
laries (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, or 256 words). The speaker read 
over the communication channel the messages randomly selected 
from the various vocabularies under the different S/N 
ratios, and the listener checked off what he heard on a 
list of all possible alternatives.
The results of this experiment showed that the digits
were easiest to correctly understand, followed by words in
a sentence, and then the nonsense syllables. Miller, Heise, 
and Lichten concluded that "the most important variable pro­
ducing the differences is the range of possible alternatives 
from which a test item is selected.3*3
A second experiment in the same study attempted to 
directly test the hypothesis that an, index of difficulty 
of discrimination can be developed not on the characteris­
tics of the particular item, but upon the range of items 
that could occur. This range was varied by informing the 
listener that each test word would be one of the items 
from a given restricted vocabulary, and the S/N ratio was 
varied for each of the conditions. Results were again 
consistent with theoretical predictions.
Since both parts of this study employed essentially
the same information technique, it is possible to examine
30lbid., p. 331.
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them simultaneously.
The first assumption, that the description be en­
tirely in the language of an external observer is easily 
met. Clearly, the experimenters were able in both experi­
ments to determine the selection of the message and analyze 
its reception using the answer sheet blanks.
Second, it is required that the scope of the analysis 
be at a macroscopic level. It is doubtful that the averaging 
techniques over the small sample were adequate in this case. 
In the first experiment, however, no figures are given indi­
cating the number of responses required for each subject, 
only the per cent correct. It is thus impossible to conclude 
that the assumption was or was not met, although since only 
two subjects were used throughout the experiment, the latter 
is more likely the case. In addition, the lengths of the 
passages were not specified except in the case of the sent­
ences (five words). lumber of trials was not specified in 
the second experiment either, although in all cases only one 
stimulus nwordl! was read at a time. The very small number 
of subjects may be indicative of insufficient averaging, 
however, and it seems reasonable to suggest that it was 
unlikely that this assumption could be met.
The third assumption, that the probabilities of the 
signals are known to the external observer, is easily met 
since the transmitted message was read from a prepared list
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in both experiments, and the responses were recorded.
Fourth, it is necessary that the message signals and 
their probabilities are known to the communicants and that 
they remain unchanged in time. In the first experiment the 
“built-in knowledge of English” assumption may be correctly 
applied only in the second type of test material (the sent- 
ences). Even in this case, questions may be raised with 
respect to the length of the samples used.31 But in consider­
ing the digits and nonsense syllables, even with ’‘knowledge­
able” subjects {i.e., those familiar with the techniques and 
the theory of the experiment), the assumption does not ap­
pear to be adequately satisfied. It is likely, for example, 
that the communicants may have been subject to the effects 
of the “gamblerfs fallacy” in the case of the digits, and 
indeterminable effects with the nonsense syllables. The 
second experiment was more clear-cut with respect to this 
assumptionj only one stimulus word was given at a time, the 
listeners know the size of the vocabulary and had a good 
idea of the probability distribution (flat, when “random” 
selection by the speaker is a s s u m e d ) , 32 Allowing for a
31 As previously mentioned, there is no information, 
except in the case of the five word sentences, of the length 
of the samples. If they were of different lengths, a bias 
may have been introduced.
32It would probably be incorrect to assume a random 
selection on the part of the speaker, but if such an argu­
ment were made, it might be possible to invoke the “identi­
cal twin” assumption of Shannon, though its applicability 
in this situation may be questioned.
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degree of non-random selection on the part of the speakers, 
it seems reasonable to suggest that this assumption is satis­
fied for the second experiment, although not in the case of 
the firsto
The last assumption, that the alphabet of signs re­
mains unchanged, is easily satisfied for both experiments.33
Capacity and Transmission
The third method of applying information theory to 
interpersonal speech communication is in the area of capa­
city and transmission# It is in this area that the appli­
cation of information measures is most controversial, due 
in large part to some basic problems which arise in describ­
ing the channel. Some of these problems have been considered 
in Chapter III, and more discussion follows in this chapter, 
as well as later.
An illustrative experiment is provided by Irwin Pol­
lack, who compared repetition procedures for Improving com­
munication in noise with network procedures.3^ The repetition
33fj0te that for each size of vocabulary a different 
experiment is performed; the results being combined in the 
conclusions.
3̂ -Irwin Pollack, ’’Message Procedures for Unfavorable 
Communication Conditions,” Journal of the Acoustical Society 
of America. 30 (195$) > pp. 196’-2d’l.
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procedures for improving communication in noise merely re­
quires that the speaker repeat the stimulus word ("target 
wofd") several times. The network procedure, on the other 
hand, employs an elimination process based on the informa­
tion theory principle that
The reception of a message from among a small ensem­
ble of messages may be accomplished correctly at a lower 
speech-to-noise (S/N) ratio than the same selection from a large ensemble of messages.35
A "target vocabulary1’ of 64 words was employed in 
both the repetition and the network procedures. The talker 
repeated the sequence (successive binary selections for the 
network, and repetition of the target word in the repetition 
procedure) until all listeners had received the message, or 
until 70 seconds elapsed. Thus, if the target word were 
’’firefly” (see Figure 3)» in the network procedure the single 
word ’firefly” would be repeated over and over, while in 
the network procedure, the words ’’cargo, duckpond, firefly” 
would be repeated. Words on the list were arranged alpha­
betically, and the talker read at the rate of one word per 
second. The talker selected the target word from a pack of 
cards, announced ’ready” over a noise-free channel, and then 
switched on noise^ before proceeding with the reading. The 
listeners’ clocks were started and ran until he was ’reason­
ably confident” of having received the message correctly,
35lbid.. p. 197.
36y/hite noise at an overall level of 90 db Spl.
and at that time he deflected a switch which stopped his 
assigned clock. The listener recorded the time and the 
received word.
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Results of the experiment showed the network proced­
ure to be somewhat more efficient, thus confirming the expert 
mental hypothesis.
Analysing the study with respect to the first assump­
tion, which requires that the description be entirely in the 
language of an external observer, it is found that the assump 
tion is satisfied. The experimenter was able to observe the 
selection of the message and also the message received.
n
The second assumption states that the theory is con­
cerned only with average, or macroscopic properties of a 
system. The five participants who served alternately as 
listener and speaker over a four month period with ten
hours of testing per week amassed a considerable amount of 
3 ?data. Since these results were averaged over the whole 
period of time, the second assumption is also met.
The third assumption, that the probabilities of the 
signals are known to the external observer and that the 
noise sources can be identified, is met. The experimenter 
knew which words were spoken, which words were received, 
and had previously specified the noise source and frequen­
cies.
Fourth, the assumption is made that the communicants 
operate with an agreed set of message signs having definite 
frequencies of occurrence, and that these probabilities re­
main unchanged in time. Both the talker and the listener 
had before them a complete vocabulary of the 64 spoken words, 
and their probabilities of occurrence were known to be ran­
dom, Thus the assumption is also met.
The last assumption, that the alphabet of signs re­
mains unchanged, is clearly satisfied.
3?3ome 500 trials were run for the determination of 
the per cent of words correct under three signal-to-noise 
ratios with both the repetition and the network procedures.
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Thus the experiment meets all of the assumptions of 
information theory. It should be pointed out, however, 
that many of the problems suggested by Cherry were circum­
vented by using an electronic communication channel, and 
not considering the human operator as a channel* In the 
following experiment Pollack also attempts to avoid those 
problems by suggesting a different sort of communication 
channel, again not the human operator.^
In this experiment he investigated the effects of 
sequentially encoded information on the rate of assimilation.39 
The proposed relation of information theory to the experi­
mental situation was as follows:
The message-set is composed of identifiable symbols—  
English consonants and numerals; choice is based on a 
table of random numbers; the transmitter is a talker; 
the channel is the oath of the sound1 waves; the receiver 
is an £ who listens to the message and, after the message 
has been presented, records it at the destination on the answer sheet.40
This process is schematized in Figure 4.
Messages were Selected from an alphabet of English
3&Cherry‘s analysis of the problems encountered in 
considering the human operator analogous to a communication 
channel are felt to be sufficient to clarify problems in 
this area, and thus no attempt will be made to analyze such 
a study in this category.
•aq' Irwin Pollack, ”Assimilation of Sequentially En­
coded Information,1’ American Journal of Psychology. 66 
(1953).
40lbid., p. 421.
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Figure 4
source
transmitter receiver 
  channelchoice destination
letters random talker listener answer
numerals numbers air sheet
consonants and numerals using a table of random numbers.
The lengths of the messages varied from 4 to 24 units, each 
unit in the message being selected from a given number of 
alternatives (2, 4, 16, or 30). The messages were read,
via a tape recorder, to 25 subjects over a period of ’many 
days,” each subject serving no more than one hour per day* 
Before each message was presented, the length of the mes­
sage and the number of possible alternatives per message- 
unit was announced.
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Results were tabulated in bits error output,41 and
showed principally that
the information lost per message-unit (i.e., the error 
output) increases as the length of the message increases, 
and as the number of possible alternatives per message unit increases,42
The first assumption, that the external observer 
must be able to observe the whole of the communication pro­
cess, is satisfied. Clearly, the experimenter knew the 
messages sent, since it was he that selected them, and the 
answer sheets completed by the listener provided him with 
the received messages.
The second assumption states that the theory is con­
cerned only with average, macroscopic properties of a sys­
tem, and not with specific, momentary properties. The experi­
menter used 25 subjects, and taking this subject ensemble, 
averaged over many trials. One question with respect to 
this assumption concerns the distribution of the trials. In 
Pollack’s experiment no subject participated more than one 
hour on any single day. This practice distribution may be 
thought to have interrupted the probabilities of responses, 
but it is more likely that increased durations of practice
41«The information lost by the receiver, here called 
the informational error output, or, more briefly, the error 
output, is the discrepancy between the input to the receiver 
and the output from the receiver,” Ibid., p. 425.
42ibid., p. 42g,
7$
would have been more problematic due to the deeline of com­
petence normally observed in massed practice distributions.43 
The assumption, then, is met.
The third assumption, that the external observer has 
made good estimates of the transmitted and received signals 
is also satisfied. Since all of the data was recorded with 
respect to signals received and sent, the experimenter had 
thorough knowledge of these probabilities and was able to 
accurately compute the error-output.
Fourth, it is required that the communicants operate 
with an agreed set of signs, and that the signs remain un­
changed with the passage of time, bsually, it was found 
that this assumption could b© satisfied by assuming that 
users of English had built-in language statistics. Since, 
however, Pollack used consonants and numerals with varying 
selection ensembles, the assumption cannot be satisfied in 
the same manner. Attempting to clarify this problem, the 
experimenter nindoctrinated” his subjects in the use of 
tables of random numbers, showed them the method of selec­
tions of the messages, and before each trial told them the 
size of the selection ensemble and the length of the message, 
ni,e., the Ss were given full knowledge of the statistical
^3ee Robert S. Woodworth, and Harold Schlosberg, 
Experimental Psychology (Rev. Ed.), (Hew York: Holt Rine­
hart, and Winsom, 1964;, pp. 736-794.
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characteristics of the message-source. It is question­
able, however, that this knowledge was as complete as was 
expected, or if it was, whether the subjects used that knowl­
edge. That is, it is unlikely that merely by telling the 
subjects a message of a certain length would be selected 
from an ensemble of a certain size, that those subjects would 
be able to alter their prior expectations with respect to a 
familiar alphabet. The assumption, then, cannot be said to 
be satisfied.
The fifth assumption states that the alphabet of 
signs remains unchanged. While this was not true over the 
whole experiment, in the determination of the error-output 
for each size ensemble, the alphabet was unchanged*^ The 
assumption is then satisfied.
The experiment discussed above suggests an additional 
problem common to many studies. The model of the communica­
tion process employed, that of the source selecting the mes­
sage, passing it to the sender, which transmits signals over 
a channel to a receiver, and thence to the destination, of­
ten does not have "adequate” correspondence with the nfact-
Pollack, p. 427.
this experiment, as in most of those discussed 
here, each variation can be considered as a separate experi­
ment.
BO
territory” it represents.^
Other Studies
It was noted in the last chapter that a number of 
investigators have attempted to use informational concepts 
in some rather peculiar ways, and that often results ob­
tained from these analyses were highly ambiguous with respect 
to the application of the theory. In this section an exam­
ination of two of the studies shall be undertaken in the 
same manner as was done for those in the three sections pre­
ceding.
A study by James Owen is illustrative of a number of 
the problems arising from these questionable applications of 
information theory. Owen proposed to "investigate the ef­
fect of ,uncertainty* on the behavior of individuals who are 
listening to an informative speech." 7̂ Auditor retention of 
an informative speech was to be tested under two conditions
 ̂It should also be noted that in experiments in 
which the human being is compared to a communication chan­
nel, the problem of controlling the input to that "ehannel" 
becomes monumental. Thus an experiment in which a ring of 
lamps are used as the stimulus may assume (tacitly) that 
there are no other input terminals or that such additional 
information input is negligible or irrelevant. As Cherry 
has noted, this is highly unlikely, since ,{a human operator 
is not an integrated organism." Cherry, "Applying Informa­
tion Theory . . . ," p. 17&,
^7James L. Owen, "The Effect of fReceiver Uncertainty1 
on Message Retention," paper delivered at the 196? Convention 
of the Speech Association of America. (Mimeographed.)
of "uncertainty,” one of stimulus uncertainty and the other 
of response uncertainty.
Two tape-recorded thirteen-minute informative speeches 
were prepared; one as it was delivered, and one in which a 
signal was introduced immediately prior to any sentence or 
phrase which contained information relevant to twenty-five 
multiple choice questions based on the speech. This cued 
tape was said to have significantly reduced the amount of 
stimulus uncertainty compared to the other un-cued tape. 
Response uncertainty was manipulated by the ordering of the 
twenty-five test questions, In one set of tests, the ques­
tions were given in exactly the order in which they were 
answered in the speeches, while in the other the order of 
the same twenty-five questions was randomized. It was sug­
gested that "subjects employing the ordered list ... 
would experience significantly less response uncertainty 
than subjects employing the random list. . . ."4$
In one experimental condition, thirty subjects were 
given time to study the twenty-five randomly ordered ques­
tions, were played the cued tape of the speech, and were 
then given twenty minutes to answer the questions. The 
other experimental group (twenty-eight Ss) was given the 
sequentially ordered set of questions, played the un-cued
$2
tape, and tested similarly. A control group (twenty-six 
3s) was given the randomly ordered questions and the uncued 
tape. The results confirmed Owen’s hypothesis that an in­
crease in either stimulus or response uncertainty signifi­
cantly decreases auditor retention of an informative speech.
Analyzing the study with respect to the assumptions 
of information theory, problems arise immediately. The first 
assumption, that the external observer must be able to view 
both ends of the channel, seems at first glance to be easily 
met. But at the receiving end, the destination is found to 
be converting the signals received only part of the time; 
i.e., those signals which were received, but not tested, 
were not observed by the external observer. Hence the obser­
ver could not be said to have complete knowledge of all that 
was sent and received. Moreover, the conversion itself was 
probably not one-to-one with what the receiver received.
That is, that in the process of answering the questions con­
cerning the speech, it is likely that the subjects may have 
had to alter their receivers ensemble in order to make the 
appropriate responses to the questions. The first assump­
tion, then, is not satisfied.
Second, it is required that the analysis be on a 
macroscopic level. Owen’s averaging techniques would nor­
mally have fulfilled this assumption, but the fact that he 
was unable to determine the receivers ’ ensembles in their 
totality, as per assumption one, means that while the
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statistical techniques may have been appropriate, they could 
not have included all of the data. Thus this assumption is 
not met.
The third assumption states that the external observer 
must have made good estimates of the probabilities of occur­
rence of the sent and received signals, and noise. As with 
the last assumption, this cannot be met, since Owen's study 
did not account for all of the received signals.
Fourth, it is required that the statistics of the 
situation remain stationary. In Owen's study subjects were 
required to answer a series of questions related to the 
speech. As he suggests, it is likely that the groups using 
the randomly ordered series of questions experienced some­
what more uncertainty than those in which the questions were 
ordered. But it is to be noted that in answering each suc­
cessive question, the uncertainty of the response ensemble 
declined. That is, while in answering the first question, 
the subjects' uncertainty was at a maximumj but once the 
first question was answered, the subjects knew that they 
would not be required to answer that question again, and 
therefore the probability of occurrence became zero. Simi­
larly, as each question was answered, the uncertainty with 
respect to the yet unanswered questions decreased, so that 
after the twenty-fourth question was answered, the subjects' 
uncertainty was zero; the next relevant statement could 
answer only the single remaining question. Hence the
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statistics of the situation were not stationary, and the 
assumption is not met.
The last assumption states that the alphabet of 
signs must remain unchanged. In Owen’s study the alphabet 
of signs is, of course, the English language, and does re­
main unchanged. This assumption is satisfied.
Owen’s study points up a number of difficulties in­
volved in taking a mathematical theory with a clearly de­
fined model, and employing the mathematics without carefully 
investigating the basis of the system itself. Another study 
which illustrates many of the same problems is one by Hower 
Hsia, He proposed to "evaluate channel behavior in terms of 
output, recalled information, error, and equivocation inter­
acting with constraint and noise factor”̂  in audio, visual, 
and audio-visual teaching methods.
Ten verses of English poetry with varying amounts 
of distributional information were selected from ten well- 
known poets, ranging from ten to twenty-eight words in 
length. Each verse was presented in two forms: one in
which the words were randomly scrambled ("nonconstrained" 
stimuli), and one as in the original ("constrained" stimuli).
^Hower J, Hsia, "Auditory, Visual, and Audiovisual 
Information Processing in Terras of Output, Error, Equivoca­
tion, and Recalled Information," paper delivered at the 
Association for Educators in Journalism. (Mimeographed.)
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Both sets of stimuli were administered under six conditions 
in combination with channel treatments (auditory, visual, 
and audiovisual), and the noise factor (noise and no noise 
conditions). In the auditory channel, white noise ’about 
twenty-five per cent of the intensity of the auditory stim­
uli” was introduced, while in the visual channel, noise con­
sisted of ”random black dots scattered over visual stimuli, 
blacking out about twenty-five per cent of the visual 
space.”50 For the simultaneous audio-visual presentation, 
both types of noise were combined. After the presentations, 
subjects (seventh grade students) were asked to write down 
what they remembered. Results showed significant differ­
ences between all groups.
Analyzing the study with respect to the first assump­
tion, that the external observer must be able to observe 
both ends of the channel, it is found that the assumption 
is satisfied. The observer could see all of the stimulus 
material, and responses were written by subjects which could 
be studied by the experimenter. The difficulty which was 
met with in the last study was not apparent in this ease, 
since there was adequate opportunity for the subjects to 
record all of their responses.
The second assumption, that the results must be
^Ibid.. p. 4.
averaged and stated in statistical terms is satisfied in 
noting that a total of 192 students was used in the experi­
ment , and responses for each group were averaged over those 
subjects and stated as averages.
Third, it is required that the external observer has 
made good estimates of the probabilities of occurrence of 
the signals, and has a complete statistical knowledge of the 
noise* While it was the case that the experimenter knew the 
probabilities of occurrence of the signals, a question arises 
concerning his knowledge of the noise. Auditory noise was 
probably adequately specified, but the visual noise consisting 
of random black dots on the visual material appeared to be 
of questionable specificity. In fact, beyond the fact that 
it "blacked out twenty-five per cent" of the material, nothing 
at all can be said about it in statistical terms. Hence the 
assumption cannot be satisfied.
The fourth assumption states that the communicants 
operate with an agreed set of signs having known definite 
frequencies of occurrence. Normally, this assumption would 
be easily satisfied, but in the case of this study, Hsia 
deliberately introduced poetry into the material assuming 
that "seventh grade students . . .  are not very well versed 
In poetry,"51 This is directly contrary to the assumption, 
and it is not, then, satisfied.
51ibid,« p. 3.
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Fifth, it is required that the alphabet of signs re­
mains unchanged* This assumption is satisfied, since no 
new or additional material was introduced into the experi­
ment while it was under way.
While Hsia’s study meets all but one of the assump­
tions of information theory, the fact is that he did not 
really use the theory at all. What appears to have happened 
is that some informational concepts were associated with 
some of the measures in his experiment, and the term informa­
tion theory was applied in the study without regard to what, 
in fact, was happening. This problem has reached almost 
critical proportions in much research in the area* It is 
not difficult to find studies under the name of ’’information 
theory,” which, as this one, have virtually no relation to 
the formal theory at all.
In the following chapter consideration will be given 
to several of the problems which have arisen during the 
course of the analyses conducted above.
CHAPTER V
CONCLUSIONS: PARAMETERS OF APPLICABILITY
In the last chapter several studies in communication 
research were analyzed with respect to whether the design 
and execution of the studies were in keeping with the as­
sumptions of information theory. The present chapter shall 
undertake an examination, on a more general level, of the 
assumptions of the theory with respect to research situa­
tions , and point out some general problems encountered in 
applying information theory to experimental research. From 
the results of such an examination some conclusions shall 
be drawn concerning the application of information theory 
in experimental interpersonal communication research.
It is clear that information theory has provided an 
impetus for scientific investigations in the area of inter­
personal communication. The suggestion that communicative 
activities may, in part, be quantified, is probably most 
responsible for the increase in activity in this area; and 
there is little doubt that information theory has been a 
vital stimulus. As the previous chapters have shown, how­
ever, the application of a mathematical theory to research 
situations does not consist simply of plugging values into 
an equation and grinding out truths about how human beings
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communicate with each other. While it may well be the case 
that a great deal of valuable information can be gleaned 
from applications of questionable validity, progress baaed 
on such work must necessarily be limited. The next three 
sections of this chapter consist of an examination of the 
three areas of application of information theory techniques 
discussed in Chapters III and IV, particularly with refer­
ence to the limitations of applicability of the theory.
Sequential Dependencies
This area of application of information theory is 
at the same time the most promising and the most perplex­
ing. Clearly, the grammatical structure of a language rep­
resents a set of statistical constraints, and redundancy is, 
to a degree, measurable. As seen in Chapter III, letter re­
dundancy is estimable, and upper and lower bounds of lang­
uage redundancy can also be set.
Uses of redundancy in experimental situations are 
many and varied.̂  Among the most interesting are the 
’’probability tests” discussed in Chapter III and employed 
in the Miller and Selfridge experiment analyzed in Chapter 
IV. It was shown there, however, that not all uses of
 ̂See George A. Miller, language and Communication 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951)> especially Chap­
ter 5, and Miller, ’’What is Information Measurement?” 
American Psychologist, 8 (1953), pp. 3-11.
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redundancy are ambiguous. Even the term itself has been 
misapplied. Binder and Wolin point out that while Weaver 
has explicitly defined "redundancy," some investigators 
have modified the definition to suit their purposes or have 
allowed themselves to be misled by fortuitous examples, 
thus introducing additional confusion.^
Beyond this, however, several important points emerge 
with respect to these studies.
First, Miller and Selfridge’s method of generation 
of "probability texts" has been questioned. Since this 
issue has been previously discussed, and studies cited which 
seem to support the validity of the method, it is assumed 
here that no serious error will result from the use of the 
method.
Second, is the question of scoring the tests. It has 
been suggested that this type of study, in fact, examines 
only one type of uncertainty (or constraint), that which 
E. R. F, V. Crossman calls the "selective source-entropy."3 
Crossman notes that the order of reproduction is an impor­
tant part of immediate memory often overlooked by informa­
tion theorists, but if it is considered, the "total source-
^Binder and Wolin, pp. 46-49.
Ê. E. F. W. Crossman, "Information and Serial Order 
in Human Immediate Memory," Information Theory Fourth London 
Symposium, ed. Colin Cherry (London:Butterworths, 1961), 
147-159.
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entropy” {the sum of the "selective” and the "order source- 
entropy”) generally gives better approximations of the ex­
perimental data.^ While these observations do not affect 
the validity of the Miller and Selfridge type of application 
of the information model, it does suggest that caution is 
needed in interpreting the results*
Third, there is a question of word-complexity, E. B* 
Coleman has noted that "analyzing an extensive sample of ap­
proximations suggested that their individual words may be­
come more and more uncommon and more complex after about the 
sixth order.”5 That is, that as the order of approximation 
increases above the sixth order, the words which form the 
lists tend to become more "difficult to learn" than even 
actual English text. This, Coleman suggests, would tend to 
discredit the basis of Miller and Selfridge’s conclusion that 
there is a leveling off of the learning curve at about the 
fifth order approximation, since the increasing word-complexlty 
would tend to counterbalance the effect of the language asso­
ciation. Coleman concludes with ah experiment in which he 
found that
■̂Grossman gives the following formulae for computing 
the entropy of lists:Selective source-entropy = Hs(s)=n loggS bits per list
Order source-entropy = Hq (s,)“ loggn̂  bits per list 
Total source-entropy = (S)= Hs(S)+H0(S)bits per list,
B. Coleman, "Approximations to English: Come Com­
ments on the Method,” American Journal of Psychology, 76 
(1963), 239-247, p. 242.
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when passages were matched in word-coraplexity, higher 
percentages were recalled as the passages approached 
the statistical structure of language, and there was no 
leveling off at fifth-order approximations. Furthermore, 
as recall was scored in longer and longer sequences, the 
effect of long-range constraints became more and more ap­
parent . ®
In addition, Garner points out that in those experi­
ments in which a single passage is learned by the subject, 
even if the single passage is long, it is not correct to 
talk about the redundancy of that passage, since there is no 
specified "parent population" from which this passage is 
drawn. If, however,
the passage is generated by introducing sequential 
restrictions between the words which can be generated, 
we can consider such a passage to be redundant by ex­
actly the same reasoning that we use to estimate the 
redundancy of a real language, namely by estimating the 
average uncertainty of the elements , , . in the single 
passage. In such a case, the actual measurement of the 
amount of redundancy is a measurement of the redundancy 
of an assumed subset of passages which could have been 
generated, and from which this particular passage was 
drawn.7
If a set of words is used in which constraining rules
operate on the generation of the words themselves, but
not between the words within the material,
redundancy cannot be defined solely in terms of the let­
ter constraints operating within the words, but must be 
defined in terms of the number of words in the set com­
pared to the number which could have been generated.$
In this type of situation, then, the experiment was on the
6Ibid.« p. 247. 
%bid., pp. 274-275.
Ĝarner, p, 274
form of the redundancy rather than the amount of it, since 
the difference between a list of words constructed by random 
selection of letters and a list in which the selection was 
constrained (but from the same parent population) ” . ♦ . 
lies not in how much selection (redundancy) was used, but 
rather in which particular words were selected*"9 The re­
dundancy, therefore, is the same.
The ability to replace missing elements in a language, 
as in the Shepard experiment, depends on two factors; there 
must exist in the stimulus material an amount of structure 
or redundancy; and second, the subject must know the parti­
cular signification rules which are operative with the given 
amount of structure.^ As Garner points out:
The chief value of these experiments is in demonstra­
ting that humans do understand the nature of their own 
language, and that their understanding affects perform­
ance involving verbal stimuli and even responses. How­
ever, these experiments fail, in large part, to attack 
the more fundamental problem, which is to determine the 
value and role of redundancy (as amount and as form) in 
perception and learning,'*
That is, if an experiment were conducted in which 
subjects were required to learn two sets of words, one set 
actual English words and the other formed by random selec­
tion of letters,
it is obvious that English speaking subjects will
9Ibid., p. 275. 
11 Ibid., p. 230,
t0Ibid,, p. 280
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learn, by free recall, the set of actual English words 
much faster than the set of nonsense words. We might 
even be tempted to say that we have demonstrated that 
redundant words are learned more easily than non-redun- 
dant words, but this seductive conclusion is quite 
wrong. In actuality, these two sets of words have ex­
actly the same amount of redundancy. We have only dem­
onstrated that familiar words are easier to learn than 
unfamiliar ones, and have demonstrated absolutely nothing 
about the role of redundancy in free-recall learning,12
Thus, until direct evidence is found concerning the 
effect of the amount of redundancy on learning (by keeping 
stimulus uncertainty constant while changing the amount of 
redundancy), little can be said with certainty concerning 
this type of application of information theory.
Hoise
Due to the lack of experimentation in this area,
again little can be said with certainty* It is possible,
however, to examine some of the reasons for this lack.
First, there are difficulties in applying the information
transmission measure to speech intelligibility work when
small sizes of vocabulary are used. Garner notes that
when we are obtaining loudness judgments . . .  it is 
quite simple to select four intensities over a speci­
fied range— and these same four intensities can be 
used throughout the particular experiment. In a speech 
experiment, however, we cannot select just four mono­
syllables since we cannot be sure that the results we 
obtain are independent of language sampling factors. 
Therefore, in the usual experiment, a single set of 
words is not ordinarily used. Rather on each presenta­
tion the subject is told which words are possible on
12Ibid.
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that presentation, and the set of possible words is 
changed over the course of the experiment so that, in­
sofar as possible, all words are paired with all other 
words in the set. This sort of precaution is necessary 
to prevent artifactually high (or low) accuracies due 
to chance factors in using groups of words which are 
highly discriminatory from each other, but not from 
words used in other sets.13
The Miller, Heise, and Lichten study examined in the last
chapter illustrates some of these difficulties. It was
found that the fourth assumption could not be satisfied due
to the unknown Influence of the language sampling factors
and the subjects* possible responses to that sampling.
Previously noted were a number of observations by 
C h e r r y ' l l  respect to this type of application. The
fact that the input terminals of the human being are not 
'independent introduces, again, factors which are difficult 
to either measure or control. For example, in the Miller, 
Heise, and Lichten experiment it was impossible to deter­
mine the effects that the environmental conditions (other 
than auditory) may have had on the subjects.
In the analysis of this experiment in Chapter IV, 
it was mentioned that the ’built-in knowledge of English” 
assumption could not be said to hold for parts of the ex­
periment, That is, while it would be justified to assume
13Ibid., p. 79.
1̂ E. C. Cherry, ”0n the Validity . . . ," pp. 178-
179.
96
that the subjects knew the probabilities of occurrence of 
the stimuli made up of words in a sentence, it was improb­
able that they had any clear conception of the probabili­
ties of occurrence of the stimuli composed of digits and 
nonsense syllables.
This experiment also suggests one of the basic prob­
lems in assuming that merely advising the subjects of the 
size of the ensemble assures the experimenter that those 
subjects in fact use this information. Such nknowledgeable 
subjects" would very likely be influenced by previous trials, 
prior learning, and other factors which might cause them to 
respond quite unlike one who had a good knowledge of the 
stimuli probabilities. The essential point here is that 
human subjects, unlike electrical communication systems, 
learn, and the test conditions may not remain stationary 
with time.
It must be remembered, of course, in considering 
the applications of information theory in the area of noise, 
that this paper has not given treatment to advanced analyses 
of speech signals and other areas of experimental phonetics 
and acoustics. It may well be the case that in those areas 
the problems encountered here could be easily surmounted.
Capacity and Transmission
The most controversial applications of information 
theory in interpersonal communication have been in the
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area of capacity and transmission. Cherry’s discussion of 
some important points concerning these applications were men­
tioned in Chapter III, and for that reason studies were se­
lected in which the human operator was not considered analo­
gous to a communication channel. But, as the analyses in 
Chapter I? have shown, other problems occur. These other 
problems result principally from the attempt to use the com­
munication system described by Shannon and Weaver as a con­
ceptual research model. An implicit assumption in Pollack’s 
experiment^ is that the message set (of numerals and conson­
ants) are semantically neutral in terms of the subjects’ 
responses to them, That is, that the subjects would respond 
as if the selections by the source were made according to a 
table of random numbers. The fact, however, that letters 
were used in the experiment probably affected the validity 
of this assumption. There can be no doubt that the subjects’ 
prior familiarity with the stimulus material might well have 
played a role in their ability to recall the material in the 
test.
Garner has suggested an additional problem in this 
type of experiment, that of the discriminability.^ Essen­
tially, it is pointed out that the range of stimulus values
15pollack, ’’The Assimilation of Sequentially Encoded 
Information.”
^Garner, p. 76-77.
9$
must be broad enough so that the subject can determine the 
differences between the stimuli. While in Pollack’s experi­
ment this was not a relevant factor, many experiments might 
be affected by the problem. In auditory discrimination ex­
periments, for example, if a frequency range of between 1000 
and 1002 Hz is used, there will be little if any information 
transmitted because of a complete failure of discrimination 
due to the extremely small range of stimuli. Similarly, 
visual stimuli should be spaced equally according to a cri­
terion of discriminability.̂ ?
Another major problem here, as in most applications 
of information theory, is that of learning. Usually it is 
assumed that learning does not play an important part in 
determining information transmission or channel capacity, 
but as Garner points out, often this is not the case.^
Luce is even more emphatic about this problem,^ as is 
Chronbach.^® The issue here is that while the mathematical 
theory of communication requires that the frequencies of 
occurrence of the responses remain unchanged in time (that 
is, that the statistics of the situation are stationary),
^Wendel Garner and Harold Hake, "The Amount of In­
formation in Absolute Judgments,” Psychological Review. 5$
(1951), pp. 446-459.
^Garner, pp. 77-7$. ^Luce, p. 50.
^Chronbach, pp. 14-26.
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in many, if not most psychological experiments which employ 
information theory, learning on the part of the subjects 
affects their conceptions of those probabilities. Every­
thing a human operator learns may affect his responses and 
his expectations about events in the future. If, then, 
subjects change their expectations of these events, the 
situation can no longer be said to be stationary, and the 
mathematical theories based on that assumption are no longer 
validly applicable.
The Problems of Meaning
It would be impossible to discuss the role of infor­
mation theory in communication without some reference to 
the concept of meaning. Since this problem is so broad 
in scope, the treatment here shall be only cursory, indica­
ting some of the basic considerations.
it is well known that, as Shannon has said, "semantic 
aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering 
problem."21 That is, that information theory is not con­
cerned with the "meaningfulness” of what was said, but with 
the problem of transmission of what might have been said.
On the other hand, as Weaver points out in the same volume, 
"this does not mean that the engineering aspects are neces­
sarily irrelevant to the semantic a s p e c t s . "22 In particular.
21 Shannon and Weaver, p. 31 • ^ Ibid.. p. S.
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he says, nthis /informationalj analysis has so penetratlngly
cleared the air that one is now, perhaps for the first time,
ready for a real theory of meaning.'f23
In a paper delivered to the 1967 convention of the
Speech Association of America, Donald Darnell attempted to
connect the concept of meaning to information theory through
the term "ambiguity."̂ 4 He pointed out that
Shannon has defined information or uncertainty as a 
function of the number of possible alternatives and 
their probabilities. True, he was speaking of the alter­
native symbols that could occur on the text transmission 
and their probabilities of occurrence. But the same 
mathematical function defines '’ambiguity,” if we consider 
the possible alternative interpretations of a message and 
their probabilities. That is, a message with only one 
conceivable interpretation is not ambiguous. A message 
with more than one possible interpretation is somewhat 
ambiguous, the more possible interpretations there are 
the more ambiguous it is, and a message is maximally 
ambiguous when all of its possible interpretations are 
equally probable (or equally well justified).25
Darnell continues by noting that this "ambiguity”
is in many respects very similar to what William Aleton
calls "vagueness.” A terra is vague, Alston says, "if there
are cases in which there is no definite answer as to whether
23Ibid., p. 27.
^Donald K. Darnell, "Meaning and Information Theory," 
(unpublished paper delivered to the 1967 convention of the 
Speech Association of America).
25Ibid., p. 2.
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the term a p p l i e s . ”26 Thus the terra ’’middle-aged” is vague, 
since there is no clearly delineated age (in years, months, 
etc.) when one is middle-aged. Informational measures, 
Darnell thinks, might be useful in specifying the degree of 
vagueness or ambiguity of such terras, giving the users of 
language a better understanding of what is meant by vague­
ness.2? This use of information measures falls into that 
category which this paper has previously (p. 13) called 
"structural information."
Other attempts to employ information theory to assist 
in clarifying the term "meaning” have also been m a d e . 2 $ » 2 9  
Most investigators feel that the primary advantage in using 
information measures in language experiments is that it 
allows the experimenter to shift the problem from that of 
"meaningfulness" to "degree of contextual constraint,"30
26williara P. Alston, Philosophy of Language. (Engle­
wood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 34.
^?Alston points out that there are advantages to 
vagueness; "Often our knowledge is such that we cannot 
formulate what we know in terms that are maximaly precise 
without falsifying the statement or going far beyond the 
evidence," (p. 36). Diplomacy might be thougho of as the 
art of being appropriately vague.
2^Yehoshua Bar-Hillel and Rudolf Carnap, "Semantic 
Information," Coiamunication Theory» Willis Jackson (New 
York: Academic Press, Inc., 1953), pp. 503-512.
^Anatol Rapoport, "What is Information?" ETC. 10 
(1953), 247-260.
3°Miller and Selfridge, p. 27.
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ignoring the "meaning” of the stimuli altogether, or assum­
ing them to be semantically neutral* As Cherry points out, 
however, if the "meaningfulness" of the stimuli is ignored, 
then an assumption is made that the response of the human 
operator will depend only upon the range of choice they 
offer and their probabilities of occurrence. But
we cannot speak of the "probability" of a certain let­
ter or word to a specific person, as a frequency. . . . 
Probabilities, to him are "degrees of belief" and at 
best may be rank-ordered, but are non-nuiaerical. But 
the Theory of Communication takes probabilities as 
relative frequencies. . , .31
It can be seen, then, that the problem of the rela­
tionship between meaning and information theory (if, in fact, 
there is any relationship at all) is one of the most critical 
areas facing the application of informational concepts in 
interpersonal communication.
Conclusions
The analyses of the studies in Chapter IV, and the 
discussion of many of the problems that arose there in the 
first sections of this chapter show clearly that there are 
many problems, both large and small, to be considered before 
an application of the mathematics of information theory can 
be attempted in an experimental situation.
On the other hand, however, there is little doubt 
that information theory has proven valuable in a great deal
^Cherry, "On the Validity . . . p. 179.
103
of research. Perhaps, as Johnson and Klare indicate, its 
most valuable use has been in the construction of models 
of communication:
Of all single contributions to the widespread inter­
est in models today, Shannon’s is the most important.
For the technical side of communication research, Shan­
non’s mathematical formulations were the stimulus to 
much of the later effort in this area. . . . Shannon 
also presented a schematic diagram of a general commu­
nication system, . . . which was the source of impetus 
for many subsequent diagraraatic models of the general 
communication problem.3k
Similarly, Shannon’s application of mathematics to 
the problems of communication has served to generate an 
interest in the potentialities of a rigorous mathematical 
approach in communication research. N i c k e r s o n ^  points out 
four separate uses of measures of uncertainty in experi­
mental research, each measure, although different from each 
other, being derived from Shannon’s formulation.
The difficulties which emerged during the course of 
the analyses presented in this paper may be generally classi­
fied into five categories:
Learning. Since the mathematical theory requires 
that the situation be stationary in time, responses generated
Craig Johnson and George R, Klare, "General 
Models of Communication Research: A Survey of the Develop­
ments of a Decade,n Journal of Communication, 2 (1961), p. 15.
^Fiaymond s. Nickerson, A Note on the Concent of Un­
certainty as Applied in Psychological Research(G. Hanscom 
Field, Bedford, Mass.: Decision Sciences Laboratory, Elec­
tronic Systems Division, Air Force Systems Command, U.S. Air 
Force. E3D-TR-65-222, October, 1965).
while learning is occurring do not form an adequate sample 
from which the probabilities can be measured. To some ex­
tent, this problem may be dealt with by using an ensemble of 
operators and assuming that these operators will learn and 
change similarly. It should be noted that information 
theory, in contrast to this approach, requires an ensemble 
of messages. In general, however, since human beings learn 
by experience and electrical communication systems do not, 
experiments in which learning plays a prominent role in 
determining probabilities of response should not be subjee- 
ted to informational analysis.
Sampling. In experiments which require the analyses 
of sequential dependencies it is very difficult to obtain 
adequate estimates of the probabilities of occurrence of 
the symbols except for very short sequences. The number 
of possible sequences of symbols increases at an exponential 
rate as the length of the message increases, thus making 
such estimates unreliable at higher orders of dependency.
Subjects. Even if no learning occurs and if ade­
quate estimates of the probabilities of occurrence of the 
symbols are available, it may well be the case that the 
subjects in the experiment do not use the knowledge they 
have. That is, because a human subject is aware of the 
probabilities of occurrence of the symbols, that knowledge 
in itself is no guarantee that he will respond in accordance
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with those probabilities. Information theory requires not 
only that the subjects know the probabilities, but also 
that they respond relative to those probabilities. Unless, 
then, the experimenter can be assured that the subjects will 
respond always with respect to the probabilities of occur­
rence of the stimuli, an informational analysis would be 
inadvisable.
Message. The assumption which assumes macroscopic 
averaging holds that in a noisy experimental situation the 
messages must be infinitely long. Human subjects, of course, 
always must deal with finite messages. While, as Luce points 
out, this does not necessarily mean that the model gives 
poor approximations for such cases, "it does suggest that 
caution is nee d e d ."34
Meaning. The relationship between uncertainty and 
meaning is at this point unclear. If symbols are chosen 
whose meaningfulness is assumed to be common among the popu­
lation, then some sort of relationship between meaning and 
uncertainty is implicitly assumed; but that relationship is 
theoretically denied except through syntactics. But if 
meaningfulness is ignored, then it is assumed that the stim­
uli are semantically neutral; and this is denied by previous
34Luce, p. 52
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experimentation^I
Other Studies*. Problems generated by the application* 
or purported application, of informational concepts to inap­
propriate research have seriously hindered the development 
of the theory* there are many other measures available which 
could well be better than that of information*” and the re­
cent upsurge of studies in * information theory11 are ofien 
illustrative of bhatjpici* the terns as well a® the theory 
must be .used with great caret
Until these problems can he adequately dealt with In 
experimental interpersonal conttmie&tlnn research (if* in 
fact*, they can he)* the future of the .application of informa­
tional analyses in this area* except m  s. conceptual model 
of communication, is* at best* limited*
^%ee also ©berryfs discussion* p* 102 of this paper*
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